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CALIFORNIA TAX COLLECTION: TIME FOR
REFORM
Daniel L. Simmons*
California'spresent revenue administration structure is
characterizedby overlappingduplication,financial waste, and
diffusion of activities and responsibilities. It is a hodgepodge
of boards and elective and appointive officials and is not truly
responsible to the Governor, the Legislature, or the people.
Such adequacy of tax administrationas we have in California
is in spite of,ratherthan because of "organization."

- Subcomm. of the Assemb. Interim Comm. on Gov't Org.,
The Need for a Departmentof Revenue in California,

(Feb. 8, 1955).
The tax collection structure in California is a duplicative
aggregation of competing agencies that have evolved from
California's original dependence on property taxes as the base
for state support. In addition, California's primitive tax
adjudication framework leaves taxpayers without guidance
with respect to interpretation of the State's tax provisions.
Indeed, the resolution of tax disputes may depend more on
the political vision of short-term elected officials and ex parte
influence of campaign supporters than on findings of fact and
application of the law to the facts. Further, application of the
law is constrained by the complete absence of precedential
guidance in the form of written opinions in past cases. Even
in the face of powerful political interest in the status quo, it is
time for California's government to take a hard look at
reform.
The State of California often is compared to a large
nation because of its geographic and economic prominence,
and the size of its population. Like any nation, the people of
279

280

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:48

California require its government to maintain infrastructure,
provide education, ensure social welfare, and create a legal
and regulatory environment in which commercial and other
interactions can occur with an expectation of reliability. The
governmental structure requires revenue to operate. The
revenue is derived from taxes. To be effective, the tax system
must be fair and reasonably efficient to attract and not
discourage business and investment, and to attract individual
economic actors (whether they are workers or investors).
Fairness requires a substantive tax regime that does not
overly burden commercial transactions and a tax system
whose collection practices do not discriminate between
competing taxpayers in enforcing compliance with the tax
law.
The collection process should involve a tax
administrative structure that is not unduly burdensome or
confusing.
Tax planning requires reliable interpretative guidelines
whether the taxpayer is trying to comply with the law,
attempting to take advantage of intentionally provided tax
subsidies, or trying to avoid taxes through statutory
loopholes. Therefore, the tax structure should provide a
taxpayer with reliability of result or, in other words, some
level of certainty about the way in which the law will be
applied. In addition, an open and fair dispute resolution
mechanism is required to ensure taxpayer trust in the tax
collection system. Every taxpayer is entitled to assurance
that all taxpayers are required to meet their obligations
under the law, and that no taxpayer is able to escape some or
all of his tax burden because of undue influence with elected
officials.
The California tax collection system, which has evolved
out of historically obsolete mechanisms, fails these
requirements. Administration of California's numerous taxes
developed in the mid to late nineteenth century to manage a
tax base almost entirely dependent on property taxes, which
had to be equalized among numerous counties in order to
apportion the burden of financing the State government.
Although the number and incidence of various taxes has
changed dramatically over the State's history, the primary
structure of its principal tax collection agency has remained
remarkably stagnant.
The collection of numerous taxes and the resolution of
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disputes involving almost all of California's taxes is the
responsibility of the four elected members of the State Board
of Equalization plus the elected State Controller, who is an ex
officio member of the Board. In spite of decades-long calls for
reorganization, California retains its burdensome and
confusing array of tax assessment and collection agencies.
The obsolete dispute resolution mechanism that is part of this
system is guaranteed to produce erratic results because the
political make-up of the elected tax collection agency changes
with each election cycle. In addition, the existence of a
dispute resolution system that is dependent on officials
elected for short terms is burdened by the appearance, if not
the reality, of a tax structure dominated by political
influence.
The first part of this article briefly explores the evolution
of California's current tax administration, including periodic
calls for the elimination of the Board of Equalization by
legislative study groups and governmental commissions. Part
II examines the California dispute resolution process with a
comparison to procedures within the Internal Revenue
Service and the U.S. Tax Court. Part III endorses numerous
past recommendations for consolidation of tax collection
agencies under the responsibility of the Governor and
recommends the creation of a California Board of Tax Appeals
to replace the Board of Equalization as the arbiter of tax
disputes. These recommendations are supported on the basis
of both good governmental policy grounds and by conformity
with the United States tax administrative process. However,
these recommendations are not supported by powerful
politically entrenched interests.
The pathway to reform,
therefore, is torturous, or perhaps completely blocked.
I.

A BRIEF LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA
TAX COLLECTION

California's only source of revenue before adopting its
first Constitution in 1849 was customs duties collected under
a Federal tariff law of 1846, which had to be returned to the
Federal government.' Early discussions of revenue sources
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of UC Davis Law Students Jiwon Jeong,
Peter Kim, Nathaniel Mason, and Byron Fong.
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for state government focused on taxation of property and on
poll taxes, but Southern California delegates to the state's
first constitutional convention were concerned that northern
mining companies would use their political power to shift the
property tax away from themselves and onto other regions.2
The solution adopted to resolve the conflict was a provision
that equal tax burdens be assessed by local elected officials.'
The Constitution of 1849 provided that:
Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state.
All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to
its value, to be ascertained as directed by law; but
assessors and collectors of town, county, and State taxes
shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district,
county, or town in which the property taxed for State,
county, or town purposes is situated.4
Notwithstanding the constitutional mandate for uniform
taxation, the burden of property and poll taxes,5 which were
the greatest sources of State revenue, was not evenly
distributed. Grazing counties ended up with higher tax
burdens than mining counties.6 The San Francisco Daily
Evening Bulletin reported that in 1861 the commercial and
agricultural counties with a voting population of 58,933 paid
$444,914 for the support of the State government, $7.55 per
capita, while the mining counties with a voting population of
60,797 paid only $168,425, $2.77 per capita. Since the state
tax rates were applied to property assessed locally, the

1. See STEVEN P. ARENA, HISTORY: CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION; THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 1879-1979, at 3, 6 (1980). For

a discussion of early California taxation, see also MARVEL M. STOCKWELL,
STUDIES IN CALIFORNIA STATE TAXATION 1910-1935, in 7 UNIV. OF CAL. AT L.A.,

PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES (G. McBride et al. eds., 1939).
2. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 4-5. In addition to the property tax, the
legislature of 1850 enacted a poll tax, a military commutation tax, a foreign
miner's license tax and a few additional taxes. See id. at 7.
3. See id. at 5.
4. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 13.
5. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 7

6. See id. at 7-8.
7. ARENA, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting S.F. DAILY EVENING BULL., Jan. 14,
1862) (quotations omitted); see also DAVID R. DOERR, CALIFORNIA'S TAX
MACHINE:

A HISTORY OF TAXING AND SPENDING IN THE GOLDEN STATE 12

(Ronald Roach ed., 2000) (stating that Governor Peter Burnett reported to the
Legislature that, by 1851, taxpayers in six ranching counties with a population
of 6367 paid $41,000 while twelve mining counties with a population of 119,917
paid only $21,000).
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elected local assessors had a powerful incentive to lower local
assessments and thereby reduce the local property owners'
share of state support.' Local assessors attempted to reduce
the tax burden of their constituents and transfer a portion of
the state property taxation into other counties. 9
The first legislative response to the unequal tax burdens
imposed on county property taxpayers was the statutory
creation of the State Board of Equalization, consisting of the
State Controller and two members appointed by the
Governor. 10 The function of the Board was to equalize
assessments among the various counties.
This legislation
also attempted to define full cash value and draw definitional
distinctions between real estate, personal property, and
improvements. 12 However, in Houghton et al. v. Austin 3 the
California Supreme Court declared that the power vested in
the State Board to raise and lower assessments violated the
California Constitutional mandate that taxes be assessed by
assessors and collectors elected in the county or jurisdiction
in which the property was located. 4
In order to eliminate this Constitutional infirmity, the
State Board of Equalization was enshrined in the State
Constitution of 1879.15 As originally structured, the Board
consisted of one representative for each of the then-existing
Congressional districts, plus the State Controller as an exofficio member. 6
Under current practice, the State
Controller is represented on the Board by the Controller's
deputy who acts for the Controller in all matters except in
cases involving exercise of the Board's constitutional
authority. 7
The Constitution was amended in 1884 to
provide for the present structure of four districts with equal

8. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM.

ON GOV'T ORG., CALIFORNIA'S

TAX

ADMINISTRATION: THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL REVENUE DEPARTMENT 12 (1965).

9. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 8 (citing WILLIAM C. FANKHAUSER, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA, in 3 UNIV. OF CAL., PUBLICATIONS IN
ECONOMICS (1913)).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Act of Apr. 4, 1870, ch. CCCCLXXXIX, 1870 Cal. Stat. 714.
Id.
See ARENA, supra note 1, at 9-10.
47 Cal. 646 (1874).
See id. at 650-51.
See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 9.
See id.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7.9(a) (Deering 2006).
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population."'
Each
member
currently
represents
approximately eight million people, ranking California's
Board of Equalization districts among the largest represented
jurisdictions in the United States.
Under the 1879 Constitution, property was to be assessed
locally.' 9
The 1879 Constitution charged the Board of
Equalization with the duty to "equalize the valuation of the
taxable property of the several counties in the State for the
purpose of taxation."2' This provision was interpreted to
permit the State Board to equalize the assessment rolls of the
various counties by adjusting the respective county
assessment rolls, but did not permit the State Board to adjust
individual assessments.2 1
Authority to adjust the
assessments of individual taxpayers was restricted to the
county boards of equalization.2 2
The State Board of
Equalization also was charged with the responsibility of
assessing the value of property owned by railroads that
operated in more than one county, including the value of the
railroad franchise,23 roadbed, rails, and rolling stock, and
apportioning the assessed value to the counties in proportion
18. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 9 (amended Nov. 4, 1884). CAL.
CONST., art. XIII, § 17, now provides that, "The Board of Equalization consists
of 5 voting members: [T]he Controller and 4 members elected for 4-year terms
at gubernatorial elections. The state shall be divided into four Board of
Equalization districts with the voters of each district electing one member. No
member may serve more than 2 terms." Id.
19. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 10. The current provision is CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 14. The 1879 Constitution also provided for the "levy and
collection of annual poll tax of not less than two dollars on every male
inhabitant of this State, over twenty-one and under sixty years of age, except
paupers, idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed. Said tax shall be paid
into the State School Fund." CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 12.
20. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 9. The current Constitution requires
the Board to "measure county assessment levels annually and [to] bring those
levels into conformity by adjusting entire secured local assessment roles." CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 18. However, after the 1978 enactment of the Taxation
Limitation Initiative (Proposition 13), the full cash value of real property is
limited to its appraised value in 1975-1976, or the appraised value of the
property when purchased, newly constructed, or a change in ownership has
occurred after 1975, plus an annual inflation adjustment not to exceed two
percent. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
21. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 56 Cal. 194, 198-99
(1880).
22. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 9.
23. The power of the State to assess a property tax on the value of a railroad
franchise was upheld in Cent. Pac. R.R. v. California, 162 U.S. 91, 112 (1896),
and S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. California, 162 U.S. 167 (1896).
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to the number of miles of railway within the county.2 4
Collecting the tax under this provision was a problem. The
county tax collectors proved to be somewhat lax in actually
collecting assessed taxes from the railroads.2" In People v.
Sacramento County Board of Supervisors26 the California
Supreme Court defeated an attempt by county supervisors to
revise assessments of railroad property by the Board of
Equalization.
The California legislature directed by statute in 1883
that the State Controller collect taxes assessed by the Board
of Equalization.2 ' This provision began a history of the
separation of assessment of tax by the Board of Equalization
and collection of taxes by an agency other than the Board,
which continues to the present day.28
In recognition of the inherent difficulties and unequal tax
burdens that resulted from attempts to equalize property
State
Constitutional
the
counties,
taxation
among
Amendment Number One, enacted by the voters in 1910,
separated state revenue sources from the property tax
Under this provision,
collected by local governments.29
24. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 10. The power of the State Board of
Equalization to assess railroad property under this provision was upheld by the
California Supreme Court in San Francisco and N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 60 Cal. 12, 29 (1882).
25. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 15-16.
26. People v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 59 Cal. 321 (1881).
27. See 1880 Cal. Stat. 31 (codified as amended at CAL. POL. CODE § 3670
(1883)); see also San Mateo County v. Oullahan, 69 Cal. 647 (1886) (upholding
this scheme as applied to single out the railroads for different tax assessment
and collection methodologies against an attack under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
28. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note 8, at 13. The
inheritance tax, introduced in 1893, Stats. 1893, ch. 168, was to be collected by
county treasurers who retained a percentage of the tax. In 1909 the State
Controller was authorized to appoint a deputy to assist in the administration of
the tax, and in 1915 the Controller was authorized to appoint an inheritance tax
appraiser in each county. See id.
29. The separation of sources, known as the Plehn Plan, was recommended
by a Commission on Revenue and Taxation created by the Legislature in 1905,
including Governor George C. Pardee, Senators J. B. Curtin and M. L. Ward,
Assemblymen H. S. G. McCartney and E. F. Treadwell, and UC Berkeley
Professor Carl C. Plehn. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 18-19. The original
from
the
commission's
that
resulted
amendment
constitutional
recommendations failed to pass. See id. at 20. A subsequent commission, also
including Professor Plehn, recommended revisions to the original proposal,
which resulted in the successful 1910 constitutional initiative. See id.; see also
STOCKWELL, supra note 1, at 16-18; DOERF, supra note 7 at 21, 25-26.
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revenue from property taxes was reserved for local
governments. The state was supported by revenue from a
gross receipts tax on public service corporations such as
railroads and utilities, a franchise tax on corporations based
on the value of the corporate franchise," a gross premiums
tax on insurance companies, a capital stock tax on banks,3 1
and an inheritance tax.2 In addition, the State had been
collecting a license fee from corporations since 1905.11
Although the 1910 change was intended to establish tax rates
for each class of taxpayer that approximated the general tax
on property values, the rates continued to vary considerably
between classes of taxpayers and between individual
companies. 4 It fell to the Board of Equalization to advise the
legislature on rates required to equalize these tax burdens; a
somewhat revised equalization undertaking. 5

30. A corporate franchise generally was valued by ascertaining the total fair
market value of outstanding securities and subtracting the value of tangible
property of the corporation. See CAL. TAX COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA TAX COMMISSION 29-30 (1928). Ultimately this system resulted in
.an arbitrary tax, the amount of which [was] impossible to anticipate and
accrue." See id. at 30. Valuation of the corporate franchise was undertaken by
the Board of Equalization using various approaches. See STOCKWELL, supra
note 1, at 128-30.
31. This tax was a personal property tax imposed on the owners of bank
shares, but the tax was generally paid by the bank. See CAL. TAX COMM'N,
supra note 30, at 19. The tax was in effect viewed as a tax on the bank,
although such direct taxation of national banks was prohibited by Federal Law.
See id.
32. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 21; see also ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON

GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 14. The inheritance tax was collected through a
dual system. See STOCKWELL, supra note 1, at 60-62. Inheritance taxes were
collected by County Treasurers, for a fee calculated as a percentage of the tax
collected, subject to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of the county in which
the decedent's real property was situated. See id. at 61. Taxes were payable to
the State Controller who also appointed appraisers for each county. See id. The
State Controller's office included the Inheritance Tax Department. See id. at
61-62.
33. See Act of Mar. 20, 1905, ch. CCCLXXXVI, 1905 Cal. Stat. 493 (current
version at CAL. POL. CODE § 416 (1905)). Fees for filing articles began at $15 to
$500 for corporations with over $1 million of capital stock plus $50 for every
$500,000 of capital stock over $1 million. Id. The annual license fee ranged
from $10 to $250 depending on the value of capital stock. Id.
34. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 21-22.
35. See id. (quoting CAL. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ON THE RELATIVE BURDEN OF
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION IN 1912 (1913)). The Board advised that the

property tax burden on public utilities was twenty to fifty percent lower than if
they had paid property taxes at the average rate on locally assessed property.
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The capital stock tax on banks initially imposed a tax of
one percent on capital stock shares. 6 A 1924 amendment to
the State Constitution empowered the Legislature to provide
for the assessment and collection of tax on certain
intangibles, including notes and shares of capital stock not
otherwise exempt from taxation.3 7 In 1925, the legislature
first imposed a tax of seven percent of full cash value on
intangibles,3" but reduced the rate in 1927 to 1.45 percent of
full cash value. 9 Both of these acts were declared invalid
because the Legislature had failed to provide for
apportionment of the tax revenue to counties and other local
jurisdictions as required by the Constitutional provision.4 ° In
addition, the license fee on corporations, which had been
repealed but reinstituted in 1915, was declared invalid when
applied to foreign corporations.4 1
Various motor vehicle taxes re-enacted and restructured
were additionally assigned to the Board of
192342
in
Equalization for assessment, but assigned to the State
Controller for collection. These included a registration fee for
private motor vehicles, a motor vehicle license tax on
commercial motor transportation that was based on gross43
receipts, and two cents per gallon tax on motor vehicle fuel.
The gross receipts tax on commercial carriers was revised,
then repealed.4 A subsequent gross receipts tax was imposed
See DOERR, supra note 7, at 25.
36. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 27.
(repealed 1933).
37. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 12
38. See 1925 Cal. Stat. 13, § 3 (codified at CAL. POL. CODE § 3627a (1925)).
39. See 1927 Cal. Stat. 399, § 2. (codified as amended at CAL. POL. CODE §
3627a (1927)). Banks were taxed by local government on real property. CAL.
TAX COMM'N, supra note 30, 14. The state tax was imposed at a flat rate on the
capital shares of stock where the base consisted of capital surplus plus
undivided profits reduced by the assessed value of real property. See id.
40. See Arnold v. Hopkins, 203 Cal. 553, 566-67 (1928).
41. See Perkins Mfg. v. Jordan, 200 Cal. 667 (1927); see also H.K. Mulford
Co. v. Curry, 163 Cal. 276, 282-84 (1912) (declaring the original 1905 tax invalid
as applied to foreign corporations).
42. California began collecting vehicle registration fees in 1905. See
STOCKWELL, supra note 1, at 88. The initial tax was a flat fee, but evolved into

a variable levy based on horsepower. See id. at 89-90. The vehicle registration
fee was paid into a "motor vehicle fund" thus beginning California's long history
of setting aside tax revenue into specific funds with limited purpose. See id.
43. Act of May 30, 1923, ch. 266, 267, 1923 Cal. Stat. 517, 571; Act of June
13, 1923, ch. 341, 1923 Cal. Stat. 706; see ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T
ORG., supra note 8, at 14; see also ARENA, supra note 1, at 24-25.
44. Common carriers were removed from the license tax in 1926 by adoption
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in 1933 on the operators of a motor vehicle carrying persons
or freight for hire.4 5 Most passenger carriers were treated as
public utilities so this tax applied only to trucking firms that
The tax was administered by the
carried goods for others.
Board of Equalization, which issued licenses and verified
returns, and was collected by the Controller. 47 These motor
vehicle fuel taxes continue to be administered by the Board of
Equalization.48
Even with the motor vehicle taxes, the loss of revenue
from the truncated bank and corporation taxes placed the
State in financial jeopardy. The contemporary structure of
California's income tax system began to evolve as the result of
a study commissioned by the Legislature in 1927 to review
the California revenue situation. In 1928, the first report of
the California Tax Commission (the Martin Commission)
recommended taxation of banks and corporations on the basis
of net income. 49 The recommendation was implemented by
constitutional amendment approved by the voters in 1928,
which authorized the Legislature to tax corporations and
banks by any method not prohibited by the Constitution, and
which provided that the tax would be based on net income
unless otherwise provided by the Legislature. 50 The tax was
implemented with the Bank and Corporation Act of 1929.51
The State Controller attempted to have administration of
the new bank and corporation income tax assigned to the
Controller's office, while members of the Board of
Equalization lobbied to have responsibility for administration
The legislative
of the tax assigned to the Board.5 2

of Section 15, Article XIII, of the California Constitution and reclassified as
public utilities subject to the public utilities gross receipts tax. See ARENA,
supra note 1, at 25. The tax, which thereafter applied only to contract carriers,
was repealed in 1928. See id.
45. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 50.
46. See id. at 50-51.
47. See id. at 51.
48. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 7301 et. seq. (Deering 2006). The Board
also administers a similar tax on jet fuel. See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §

7370 et. seq. (Deering 2006).
49. See CAL. TAX COMM'N, supra note 30, at 18-19.
50. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 16 (Nov. 6, 1928) (current version at CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 27).
51. See Bank and Corporation Act of 1929, ch. 13, 1929 Cal. Stat. 19.
52. See DOERR, supra note 7, at 30.
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compromise influences income tax administration to this day.
Administration of the corporate franchise tax was assigned to
the Franchise Tax Commissioner, who was to be appointed by
a special committee consisting of the Controller, the Director
of Finance, and the Chair of the Board of Equalization. 3
Appeals from assessment of the tax were to be made to the
Board of Equalization.5 4 The same pattern was followed in
the enactment of the Personal Income Tax Act of 1935;11
administration was assigned to the Franchise Tax
Commissioner, and the Board of Equalization was designated
to hear appeals. 56 The 1937 enactment of a supplemental
corporate income tax applicable to corporations engaged

53. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note 8, at 15; see also
ARENA, supra note 1, at 30.
54. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 30.

55. See Personal Income Tax Act of 1935, ch. 329, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1090-91.
The personal income tax was authorized by Constitutional Amendment 30
(approved by the voters June 27, 1933), which added Article XIII, section 15, of
the California Constitution to provide in part that,
The Legislature shall provide for the raising of revenue by any form of
taxation not prohibited by this Constitution in amounts sufficient to
meet the expenditures of this State not otherwise provided for and in
amounts sufficient to apportion, and shall apportion, to each county or
city and county of this State, an amount equal to the entire amount
required to be raised by each such county or city and county
respectively ....
Act of May 6, 1933, ch. 63, 1933 Cal. Stat. 3072, 3076.
In addition to authorizing the Legislature to enact forms of taxes as it
determined, Constitutional Amendment 30, the so-called Riley-Stewart Plan
named after State Controller Ray L. Riley and Board of Equalization member
Fred E. Stewart, terminated the separation of sources concept, returned public
utilities to local tax rolls (although public utility property is still assessed by the
Board of Equalization), transferred public school expenditures to the State from
the counties thereby reducing the tax burden on real property, imposed a
spending limitation on counties and school districts of not more than five
percent of the preceding year's expenditures, imposed a biennial spending limit
on the State not to exceed more than five percent of the expenditures in the
preceding biennium, and prohibited raising more than twenty-five percent of
state funds with an ad valorem property tax. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 22;
see also ARENA, supra note 1, at 38-39; see ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T
ORG, supra note 8, at 15-16; STOCKWELL, supra note 1, at 163-200. The Riley-

Stewart plan worsened the state deficit by reducing state revenue from the
utility tax and adding education costs without increased state revenue. See
DOERR, supra note 7, at 34.

56. Attempts to assign administration of the personal income tax to the
Board of Equalization were
note 1, at 250. Reportedly
elected, the Franchise Tax
therefore subject to political

defeated in the Assembly. See STOCKWELL, supra
it was argued that while the Board members are
Commissioner is appointed by the Governor and
control. See id.
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solely in interstate commerce also provided for administration
by the Franchise Tax Commissioner.5 7
The transformation of the position of Franchise Tax
Commissioner into the existing Franchise Tax Board is one of
the unusual stories that seems to characterize California
Charles L. McColgan, a former State
political history.
Assembly member from San Francisco, was appointed in 1931
The 1934
as the third Franchise Tax Commissioner.5 8
constitutional amendment creating the civil service protected
most State employees, with exemptions for persons appointed
by the Governor and elected officials, among others. This did
not include the Franchise Tax Commissioner who was
appointed not by the Governor, but by the Controller, the
Governor's Finance Director and the chair of the Board of
The Franchise Tax Commissioner thus
Equalization.5 9
became subject to civil service protection and could not be
removed under the 1929 act that created the position. "The
Franchise Tax Commissioner became the only civil service
employee not responsible to anyone for his conduct or
professional actions." 60 Apparently, Commissioner McColgan
took full advantage of this autonomy. A 1948 legislative
investigation of the San Francisco office of the Franchise Tax
Commissioner 6 1 "revealed a picture of gross inefficiency and
maladministration"6 2 including a "widespread practice of
employees ... soliciting and performing outside employment
which is incompatible with their duties as state employees."63
As a consequence, the Legislature abolished the position of

57. See SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., THE
The
NEED FOR A DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE IN CALIFORNIA 57 (1955).

Legislature rejected an attempt to assign administration of the personal income
tax to the Board of Equalization. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 54.
58. See ARENA, supra note 1, at 30.
59. See CAL. CONST. art. XXIV, § 4 (1934) (current version at CAL. CONST.

art. VII, § 4).
60. SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note

57, at 57.
61. ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND ECON.,
PARTIAL REPORT ON THE SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF THE FRANCHISE TAx
COMMISSIONER (1949).
62. SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note
57, at 57.
63. ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 17 (quoting
ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY AND ECON., supra
note 61, at 19).
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Franchise Tax Commissioner and restructured the position
into the Franchise Tax Board consisting of the State
Controller, the Director of Finance (an appointed member of
the Governor's staff), and the Chair of the Board of
Equalization, the same group of officials originally designated
as the appointment authority for the Franchise Tax
Commissioner. 64 The Franchise Tax Board succeeded to all of
the duties of the Franchise Tax Commissioner. 65
The
Franchise Tax Board currently appoints an executive officer,
subject to the consent of two-thirds of the State Senate, who
is subject to removal by a two-thirds vote of the Board.6 6
The 1929 final report of the Martin Commission
contained far-reaching recommendations in addition to the
income based franchise tax. The Commission described the
existing tax system as "fundamentally faulty"6" and
recommended a tax structure consisting of the property tax
dedicated to local government, a business tax on net income
from business carried on in California to support State
government, and a personal income tax to be divided between
state and local government. 69
Significantly, the Martin
Commission recommended abolition of the Board of

64. See Act of July 25, 1949, ch. 1188, 1949 Cal. Stat. 2108.
65. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15700 (Deering 2006). The Franchise Tax Board
is housed in the California Consumer Services Agency. See id. § 12804.
Currently, the Franchise Tax Board is responsible for the administration of the
personal income taxes, the corporation tax, and the so-called "taxpayers' bill of
rights." See CAL. REV. AND TAX. CODE § 19501 (Deering 2006).
66. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15701 (Deering 2006). The original legislation

required a two-thirds vote of the State Senate to remove the executive officer,
thereby providing security of employment almost as great as the civil service
protection enjoyed by Commissioner McColgan. Act of July 25, 1949, ch. 1188, §
2, 1949 Cal. Stat. 2108,. The removal provision was required to induce the first
incumbent, John J. Campbell, to accept the executive director position. When
the removal provision was repealed in 1979 (1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 1203 § 1), the
then executive director, Martin Huff, resigned from the position. See DOERR,
supra note 7, at 48, 169-70, 440. Doerr suggests that one of the reasons the
legislature was willing to revise the removal language was concern that Mr.
Huff was preparing to tax the legislative per diem allowance. See id. at 170.
67. See CAL. TAX COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA TAX
COMMISSION 1 (1929).

68. Id. at 1.
69. See id. at xxi; see also SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON
GOV'T ORG., supra note 57, at 57. The personal income tax was first
recommended in 1917 as a substitute for the property tax by the Tax
Commission of that date. See REPORT OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION,110
(1917).
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Equalization and its replacement by a tax commission
consisting of three members appointed by the Governor.7"
This was the first of multiple attempts to eliminate the Board
of Equalization.7 1 The report of the Martin Commission
contains guidance that should be inscribed on the desk of
every California legislator:
"Students of government find one of the fundamental
faults in American government to be the willingness to write
upon the statute books laws which theoretically call for a high
degree of equity without the willingness to provide the
necessary machinery for carrying these laws into effect. 7 2
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Martin
Commission and its loss of authority over collection of the
corporate franchise tax, the role of the Board of Equalization
was strengthened with enactment of the retail sales tax in
1933."3 Administration of the new sales tax was assigned to
the Board. The Board of Equalization was also designated to
hear sales tax appeals from the decisions of its own
administrators. At the end of prohibition in 1933, a State
Constitutional Amendment delegated to the Board of
Equalization the power to license and collect taxes with
respect to the sale of alcoholic beverages.7 4 Licensing and
regulation of alcoholic beverages was transferred by
constitutional amendment in 1954 to the Department of

70. CAL. TAX COMM'N, supra note 67, at xxiv, 131. The report states: "The
Commission considers this recommendation fundamental and desires to
condition its other recommendations for changes in the tax system upon its
acceptance." Id. at xxiv.
71. Efforts to abolish the Board occurred no less than forty times after this
1929 attempt. See ARENA, supra note 1,at 33.
72. CAL. TAX COMM'N, supra note 67, at 116. The report also states, "It is of
course trite to observe that a law is no better than its administration. If the
standards of the community would countenance the apportionment of the
burdens of government by the rough and crude methods of primitive countries,
there would be no problem here. The complications arise because the people
insist upon fairness in taxation. Administration, indeed, is an important
limiting factor upon progress." Id.
73. See 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 1020, p. 2609. The sales tax, like the personal
income tax enacted in 1935, was authorized by Constitutional Amendment 30,
adding Article 30, section 15, of the California Constitution, enacted by vote of
the people in 1933. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 15; supra note 55. The sales
tax and income tax acts were drafted in significant part by Roger Traynor who
later became Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. See DOERR, supra
note 7, at 37.
74. See CAL. CONST., art. XX, § 22 (amended 1934).
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Alcoholic Beverage Control, but assessment and collection of
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages remains with the Board of
Equalization.75 In 1937, the Legislature enacted a diesel fuel
tax (use fuel) administered by the Board of Equalization as a
supplement to the gasoline tax. 76 A private car tax was
enacted that same year, which replaced the state assessed,
but locally collected, property tax on privately owned railroad
77
cars, also administered by the Board of Equalization.
Administration of the gift tax, enacted in 1939,78 was
assigned to the Controller to accompany the inheritance tax
enacted in 1893 that had been administered by the Controller
since 1911. 71 In a significant change in tax administration,
80
the Bradley-Burns Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law
authorized the State Board of Equalization to administer and
collect sales and use taxes imposed by cities and counties." A
cigarette tax administered by the Board of Equalization was
enacted in 1959,2 and the Board was assigned administration
of a television subscription tax enacted in 1963,3 which was
repealed by initiative in 1 9 6 4 .'
Also, the Board of
Equalization was given constitutional responsibility for
administration of the net income tax on insurance
companies. 5
Employment payroll taxes and disability
insurance are administered by the Employment Development
Department. The most recent annual report of the Board of
Equalization lists thirty-three taxes and fees administered by
the Board. 6
As was the case with the 1929 Martin Commission

75. See CAL. CONST., art. XX, § 22 (amended 1954).

76. See Use Fuel Tax Act of 1937, ch. 352, 1937 Cal. Stat. 763-70.
77. See Act of Aug. 27, 1937, ch. 283, 1937 Cal. Stat. 621-27.
78. See Gift Tax Act of 1939, ch. 652, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2079.
79. See Act of Mar. 23, 1893, ch. CLXVIII, 1893 Cal. Stat. 193; Act of Apr. 7,
1911, ch. 395, 1911 Cal. Stat. 713. California inheritance and gift taxes were
repealed in 1982. Proposition 6, ch. 1535, § 16, 1982 Cal. Stat. 5988.
80. Bradley-Burns Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law of 1955, ch. 1311,
1955 Cal. Stat. 2381.
81. See id.
82. See Cigarette Tax Law of 1959, ch. 1040, 1959 Cal. Stat. 3061.
83. See Act of July 24, 1963, ch. 5, 1963 Cal. Stat. 5016.
84. Free Television Act of 1964, 1964 Cal. Stat. A-132, § 8.
85. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28.
86. See CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, 2004-2005 ANNUAL REPORT,
TAXES AND FEES ADMINISTERED BY THE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 2004-2005, at

6 (2006), http://www.boe.ca.gov/annual/pdf/2005/1-profile05.pdf.
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report, the confusing nature of California tax administration
was recognized in a 1955 legislative report that concluded:
California's revenue administration structure should be
organized to provide a reasonably efficient, economical,
understandable, and responsible vehicle for administering
our tax laws. This can be accomplished best by placing
the administration of major state taxes in a Department of
Revenue headed by a Director appointed by the Governor,
confirmed by the State Senate, removable by the
Legislature for cause, and, therefore, responsible to the
Governor and the Legislature, and through them, to all of
the people. 87
The 1955 report went on to say:
Historically, insofar as the committee has been able to
determine, every comprehensive report on the subject that
has been made by objective, unbiased persons who were
not part of California's existing revenue administration
structure (and whose own positions would therefore not be
affected) has endorsed consolidation of the State's major
revenue agencies in some form or other. The committee
knows of no comprehensive, independent study8 that has
defended the existing organization-or lack of it.1

Ten years later, a 1965 legislative study recommended
that "a Department of Revenue be established with
responsibility for the statutory state tax collection functions
presently exercised by the State Controller, the Board of
Equalization and the Franchise Tax Board." 9 The study
noted that, "For more than 35 years legislative committees
and special commissions have consistently recommended
unification of revenue collection. This consensus has been
supported by each of our present state officials with tax
administration responsibilities." 90 The study recommended
that "the Department of Revenue be administered by a
Director of Revenue appointed by the Governor with Senate
confirmation and removable by the Legislature for cause."91
The study also recommended that the Board of Equalization
87. SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note
57, at 9.
88. Id. at 25; see also id. at 37 (providing a list of recommendations for a
consolidated revenue administration predating the 1955 report).
89. ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note 8, at 43.

90. Id. at 9-10.
91. Id. at 43.
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be designated as the board of tax appeals.9 2
The multiplicity of taxes in California administered by
different agencies led the 1965 Legislative study committee to
comment:
The distribution of tax collection responsibility among
several agencies presents a complicated picture to the
taxpayer. An individual taxpayer is faced with the
confusing situation of having to deal with as many as four
separate agencies in the payment of his state taxes and in
some instances having to deal 93with more than one agency
in the payment of a single tax.
The Committee added:
A taxpayer engaged in a small business, for example, pays
his sales tax to the Board of Equalization, his corporation
income tax to the Franchise Tax Board, his unemployment
and disability insurance taxes to the Department of
Employment, his registration fees for commercial vehicles
to the Department of Motor Vehicles and so on. [ 1 To add
to this complexity, several taxes are jointly administered
by more than one agency. The Insurance Commissioner
and the Board of Equalization have joint responsibilities
in the assessment of the gross premiums tax on insurance
companies and the tax is then collected by the State
Controller. 94

In his testimony to the Committee, A. Alan Post, the
State's highly respected Legislative Analyst at that time,
stated:
I would make the case that it would be beneficial to the
public to be able to go to one tax agency, and to know that
you could get your tax business done there, rather than
having the present complex decision of knowing whether
to go, with respect to one tax to the Controller, another to
the Board of Equalization, and then to another agency,
and so forth.
This is just bad business from the
standpoint of the public and the public's time is wasted by
the present system and there's no doubt about it.9
The 1965 study also concluded that the California revenue
structure fails to focus authority and responsibility in the

92. See id.
93. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note 8, at 10.
94. Id. at 36.
95. Id.
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Governor.
"Under the California Constitution, the Governor is
responsible for the enforcement of all laws. The present
structure for revenue administration, violates the principle of
concentrating administration of the executive branch under
the chief executive.
In addition to having several tax
agencies, the responsibility for administration is shared by
various elective and appointive officials."96
Mr. Post, the Legislative Analyst, testified on this point
that:
I contend that this is a dangerous way to organize,
because as in the case of liquor administration, as in the
case of other scandals in other states, the real problems
come about primarily in those cases where nobody was
responsible 9 7 because everybody appeared to be
responsible.

The California property tax revolt of 1978, with the
voters' enactment of Proposition 13, minimized the Board of
Equalization's historic role with respect to equalizing ad
valorem real property taxes among the counties.9
Proposition 13 provides that property tax on real property
shall not exceed one percent of full cash value. 9 "Full cash
value" is limited to the assessed value shown on the 1975-76
property tax assessment, but property may be reassessed to
the appraised value of the property when purchased or newly
constructed.1 00
Full cash value is allowed to reflect an
inflation adjustment not to exceed two percent for any given
year, may be decreased to reflect declines in the consumer
price index or comparable indices, and may be decreased to
reflect declines in value from various causes. 10 1 Restrictions
on real property assessment, limiting value to acquisition
value, eliminate the need for equalization of values among
the counties.
The original constitutional function of the
Board to equalize assessment rolls across the counties has
been rendered obsolete.
While studies
and commissions have regularly
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 37.
Id.
For a history of Proposition 13, see DOERR, supra note 7, at 130.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a).
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2(a).
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2(b).
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recommended consolidation of tax collection functions in a
single agency, as was the case with the 1929 enactment of the
Bank and Corporation tax, which created the position of
Franchise Tax Commissioner, 10 2 jockeying for authority under
various tax collection agencies has derailed reform. In 1994,
the California Legislature enacted legislation that would have
abolished the Franchise Tax Board and transferred its
responsibilities to the Board of Equalization. 10 3 The proposed
legislation would have assigned all taxpayer administrative
appeals to the staff of the Board of Equalization. The Board
itself would have had authority to adjudicate taxpayer
appeals. In vetoing this legislation, Governor Pete Wilson
said:
AB 15 would centralize all state tax policy,
implementation, and administration outside the executive
branch of government. This makes no sense. Ultimately,
the Governor is held accountable for the operations of
state government, including the tax system, and should
be. [T] In contrast, most other state revenue departments
by the Governor,
are administered by a director appointed
10 4
and confirmed by the state Senate.
The Governor's veto message also noted the "conflict of
interest inherent in the structure proposed in Assembly Bill
15, in which the Board of Equalization serves as both
administrator of the tax system, as well as the appellate body
for taxpayer appeals."0 5
Again in 1996, following the direction of Governor
the Constitutional
Revision
Wilson's veto message,
Commission, appointed by the Governor, recommended
"abolishing the board of Equalization and the Franchise Tax
Board and combining their regulatory and executive functions
and those of other major revenue agencies into a new
Department of Revenue."0 6 The Commission added that "a

102. See supra text accompanying note 52.
103. Assemb. B. 15, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). The bill was enrolled
on September 6, 1994 and later vetoed by the Governor on September 30, 1994.
Id.
104. Governor's Veto Message to the California Assembly Regarding
at
Bill
No.
15
(Sept.
30,
1994),
available
Assembly
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94Ibilllasm/ab-0001-0050/ab_15vt940930.
105. Id.
106. CAL. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 20 (1996).
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state tax appeals body should be established, appointed by
the governor and subject to senate confirmation."107
The value of consolidating administration of various
taxes into a single agency was most recently recognized in the
report of the Governor's California Performance Review that
states:
California's tax collection system is currently divided
between four different agencies: Board of Equalization,
Franchise Tax Board, Department of Motor Vehicles, and
the Employment Development Department collects
employment taxes. It is important to streamline tax
collection in order to facilitate financing for needed
services to maintain the trust of taxpayers. In its
comprehensive review, CPR found three main obstacles to
efficient tax collection in the state:
" California's tax system is duplicative.
" California's tax system is inefficient.
" California's tax system is confusing for taxpayers.
To address these problems, California's revenue agencies
will be consolidated into one California Tax Commission.
This Commission will integrate revenue collection
activities independent of the budget and fiscal agencies.
By consolidating revenue agencies, the California Tax
Commission will eliminate duplicative functions and
responsibilities, be open and accountable to the people,
maintain a high level of efficiency, and maintain and
promote customer service, providing a one-stop-shop
where any taxpayer can resolve tax issues.10
In 2004, the Governor's Performance Review Commission
introduced its 126 recommendations by stating that the
recommendations collectively will "[c]reate a clear line of
authority to the Governor."1 0 9 While its final report is
somewhat ambiguous on this point, the Commission seems to
suggest that its recommended California Tax Commission
will consist of the State Controller and the elected members

107. Id.
108. CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMM'N, CALIFORNIA PERFORMANCE
REVIEW - THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, THE REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA

PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMMISSION 440-41(2004).
109. Id. at 5.
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of the State Board of Equalization.1 10
This approach,
however, ignored both the Commission's own professed desire
to create clear lines of administrative authority to the
Governor, and the earlier wisdom of previous studies of the
issue calling for a consolidated tax agency for which the
Governor is held responsible.
As noted in the 1965 Legislative study:
The product of 115 years of taxation in California is an
administrative structure that has developed to meet
specific fiscal crises. While there are historical reasons for
the present assignment of tax collection responsibilities
among several agencies, there is little over-all
administrative rationale to the current structure.'
The California Performance Review Commission is correct in
its observation that the California tax system is duplicative,
inefficient, and confusing to taxpayers. 112 Again, as indicated
in the 1965 study, "there is no central agency with
responsibilities for tax collection.
There is no single
administrator who can be held responsible by the Governor,
the Legislature, or the people for the administration of the
revenue laws." 3
The California Legislative Analyst stated in her
Analysis of the 1993-94 state budget bill:
A long-standing recommendation of the Legislative
Analyst's Office has been to integrate the existing tax
administration functions of the Franchise Tax Board
(FTB) and the Board of Equalization (BOE) into a new
Department of Revenue ....
In our view, this proposal
represents a real opportunity to achieve improved services
and long-run savings despite
the potential for increased
14
costs in the short-run.'
110. The staff report states, "The Board of Equalization should be retained,
while other tax collection programs should be consolidated under the California
Tax Commission. The members of the Board of Equalization should serve as ex
officio members of the California Tax Commission, with the State Controller
serving as the Commission's initial chairperson." CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW,
FORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION: A FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE AND
PRODUCTIVITY OF CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT 78 (2004), available at
http://cpr.ca.gov/report/cprrpt/frmfunc/pdf/Vol 2-FormFolFunct.pdf.
111. ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG. supra note 8, at 17.
112. See CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 108 at 440-41.
113. ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 31.
114. LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, REPORT TO JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
COMMITTEE, ANALYSIS OF 1993-1994 BUDGET BILL, 1992-1993 Reg. Sess., at H-
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The Legislative Analyst's Office reached a slightly
different conclusion in a 2005 report that examined potential
savings from a limited consolidation of the payment and
documentation functions of the Board of Equalization,
Franchise Tax Board, and the Employment Development
Department. 115 The report's findings were summarized as
follows:
Consolidation of the tax agencies' payment and
documentation processing activities could in the medium
to long term generate some annual cost savings and
interest earnings through elimination of duplicative
functions and increased efficiencies. The state, however,
would have to incur significant net costs in the short term
to achieve these savings. In addition, such benefits are
likely to be less than benefits from increasing electronic
processing. We therefore recommend that low priority be
given to consolidation of payment and document
processing functions
in favor of steps to increase electronic
116
processing.
The report also states that "the aggressive pursuit of
electronic
technologies"
would
advance
the overall
consolidation of tax agency functions with a combined webbased approach to filing returns and remitting tax payments
through electronic fund transfer.1 1 7
The most recent legislative attempt at consolidation of
the tax agencies involved a reprise of the vetoed 1994
legislation'1 8 to consolidate the Franchise Tax Board and the
Employment Development Department into the State Board
of Equalization. Assembly Bill 2016, introduced in 2006,11'
was sponsored by Board of Equalization member Bill Leonard
and was rejected by the legislature. Staff analysis for the
California Assembly Committee on Appropriations described
opposition to the legislation as follows:
Opponents note that the BOE is the only elected tax
commission in the United States. The other states and the
14 (Cal. 1993).
115. See LEGIS.

ANALYST'S OFFICE, TAX AGENCY CONSOLIDATION:
REMITTANCE AND RETURN PROCESSING 1 (Cal. 2005). The report was prepared

in response to legislative direction. See 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3473 (West).
116. Id. at 1.
117. See id. at 23-26.
118. See Assemb. B. 15, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
119. Assemb. B. 2016, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
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federal government have subsumed tax administration
under the executive branch as an essential governmental
function. An independently elected tax board is not
responsible for the impact of its tax administration
decisions on the government's ability to provide services,
and may be more vulnerable to political pressures to
decide tax disputes in the favor of the taxpayer.
Additionally, the California Tax Reform Association raises
the concern about the separation of powers under the
consolidated BOE proposed in this bill, since the
administrative and adjudicatory processes for resolving
tax disputes
would rest with the same agency - the
120

BOE.

Notwithstanding
California's
long
history
of
recommendations for consolidation, the administration of
revenue collection in California is not likely to change. The
Board of Equalization is an institution of elected political
officials.
Even before the imposition of term limits on
California legislators, the Board of Equalization provided an
additional opportunity for higher political office. 121 Now,
legislators unable to run for their former seats view its
elected positions as an opportunity and a potential jumping
off point for higher statewide office. Thus, attempts to
consolidate tax administration in an agency directly
responsible to the Governor, which also contemplates
elimination of the elected Board of Equalization, are probably
doomed to failure. Conversely, as noted in the opposition to
Assembly Bill 2016,122 consolidation of the Franchise Tax
Board into the elected Board of Equalization is likely to fail
because it removes responsibility for tax collection from the
executive branch of the California government. In addition,
proponents of effective revenue law enforcement will oppose
any reduction in the effectiveness of the Franchise Tax Board
by putting that agency within the control of the elected
politicians of the Board of Equalization. Nonetheless, some

120. ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS,

ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL

2016, 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). Note, however, that currently the
executive director of the Franchise Tax Board also is not responsible to the
Governor.
121. In 2006, former Board Member John Chaing successfully ran for State
Controller. Former Board Member Claude Parish ran unsuccessfully for State
Treasurer.
122. Assemb. B. 2016.
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improvement in California Tax administration might be
achieved by providing an independent review mechanism of
Board actions. Under the current system, not only does the
Board of Equalization administer a wide array of taxes, it is
the appellate body of first resort with respect to appeals from
taxes it administers and taxes administered by the Franchise
Tax Board.
II. THE CALIFORNIA TAX APPEALS PROCESS
In general, the individual income tax and the corporate
franchise tax are assessed by the Franchise Tax Board.
Assessments are appealable to the Board of Equalization
prior to payment of the tax. Sales and use tax issues are also
appealable to the Board of Equalization, the agency
responsible for assessing the tax.
Once a Board of
Equalization decision becomes final, the taxpayer's only
resort is to pay the tax, file an administrative claim for
refund through the Franchise Tax Board and/or the Board of
Equalization, then file a refund suit against the State of
California in the Superior Court.
1.

Review Proceduresat the FranchiseTax Board

As under the Federal system, California income tax is
self-assessed with payment due on the statutory due date for
filing a return.12 3 The Franchise Tax Board is directed by
statute to examine the return and conduct an audit as soon as
practicable. 2 4 The Franchise Tax Board generally has four
years from the date of the filing of a return to issue a Notice
of Proposed Assessment of delinquent taxes due. 125
A
123. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19001 (Deering 2006).

Calendar year

individuals are required to file by April 15th following the close of the calendar
year. See id. Fiscal year taxpayers are required to file returns by the fifteenth
day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year. See id. § 18566.
Partnership and Limited Liability Company returns are due on the fifteenth
day of the fourth month following the close of the tax year. See id. § 18633.
124. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19032 (Deering 2006). The Franchise Tax

Board audit procedure is described in Franchise Tax Board Regulation § 19032.
See 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 350 (West). Franchise Tax Board Regulation §
19032(a)(2) states that the taxpayer may reasonably expect the Board to
complete its audit within two years of the date a return is filed unless the audit
is delayed by fraud or taxpayer delay. See id.
125. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19057(a) (Deering 2006). The statute of

limitations is extended to six years if the taxpayer fails to include items
compromising 25 percent or more of gross income. See id. § 19058(a).
The
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taxpayer who intends to dispute the Franchise Tax Board's
proposed assessment must file a Protest Letter with the
Franchise Tax Board within sixty days of the date of mailing
of the Notice of Proposed Assessment. 126 On the timely filing
of a taxpayer's protest, the Franchise Tax Board is required
to reconsider the assessment and grant the taxpayer an oral
hearing if requested. 127 If the taxpayer fails to file a timely
protest letter, the Franchise Tax Board assessment becomes
final and is not thereafter appealable to the Board of
Equalization.2 8
Taxes paid with a return or paid under a final
determination of the Franchise Tax Board are subject to a
claim for refund against the state. A claim for refund first
must be filed with the Franchise Tax Board 129 by the later of
four years from the due date for the return or one year from
the date of payment.130 A claim for refund may also be filed
with the Franchise Tax Board within two years of a
determination by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
results in an adjustment that affects California tax
liability.1 3 ' The Franchise Tax Board's action on a claim for
refund becomes final ninety days from the date of mailing of
the Franchise Tax Board's notice of action on the claim unless

statute of limitations is eight years in the case of an abusive tax shelter
transaction. See id. § 19755. The Notice of Proposed Assessment must state
the reasons for the assessment, explain the computations involved, and advise
the taxpayer of the filing date for a protest of the assessment. See id. § 19034.
126. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19041(a) (Deering 2006). A protest letter
will be considered timely if it is filed on or before the last day specified in the
Notice of Proposed Assessment as required under section 19034 of the
California Revenue and Tax Code. See id. § 19041(b).
Amounts that are
assessed by the Franchise Tax Board attributable to mathematical errors are
not treated as deficiency assessments subject to protest or appeal by the
taxpayer. See id. § 19051. The same applies to taxpayer overstatement of
amounts withheld or estimated payments. See id. § 19054.
127. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19044(a) (Deering 2006). Proposed section

19044(c)
of
the
California
Franchise
Tax
Board
Regulation,
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/regs/19044_032700.PDF, provides that the taxpayer is
entitled to request a hearing at an office of the Franchise Tax Board that is
convenient to the taxpayer, and such requests are to be granted when possible.
Id. Hearings may be conducted by telephone or video conferencing if the
taxpayer consents. Id.
128. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19042 (Deering 2006).

129. See id. § 19382.
130. See id. § 19306.
131. See id. § 19311.
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the taxpayer files an appeal with the Board of Equalization. 132
If the Franchise Tax Board fails to issue a notice of action
within six months of the date the taxpayer's claim for refund
is filed, the taxpayer may treat the refund claim as denied
and appeal to the Board of Equalization 1 33 or file suit for
refund in the Superior Court. 134 Although the taxpayer must
1 35
file the claim for refund with the Franchise Tax Board,
appeal to the Board of Equalization is not a prerequisite to
filing a suit for refund in the Superior Court. A suit for
refund in the Superior Court must be filed by the later of four
years from the due date for the tax return, one year from the
date on which the tax was paid, ninety days after notice of
action by the Franchise Tax Board on a claim for refund, or
ninety days from a determination by the Board of
Equalization on a taxpayer's appeal from an action by the
136
Franchise Tax Board on a claim for refund.
2. Appeal to the Board of Equalization
Appeal to the Board of Equalization is the only avenue
available to the taxpayer to contest a determination of a tax
deficiency by the Franchise Tax Board in advance of payment
of the tax. An appeal from the Franchise Tax Board's notice
of action on a protest must be filed with the Board of
Equalization within thirty days of the date on which the
Franchise Tax Board mails its notice of action upon the
protest, or an alternative date specified in the notice of
proposed action by the Franchise Tax Board as the last date
1 37
on which to file an appeal.
The Board of Equalization is required to "hear and
determine the appeal," 38 and to notify the taxpayer and the
Franchise Tax Board "of its determination and the reasons
therefore."1 39 The Board of Equalization Rules of Practice
prescribe the form of the appeal, 40 a briefing schedule,' and
132 See id. § 19324(a).
133. See id. § 19331.
134. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19385 (Deering 2006).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. § 19382.
See id. § 19384.
See id. § 19045.
Id. § 19047.
Id.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 5012 (2007).
See id. § 5075.1.
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rules for the conduct of the hearing.'
At the outset of the
hearing, a Board of Equalization staff member summarizes
the issues in a case, followed by the presentation of the
taxpayer, then the Franchise Tax Board.14 3 The taxpayer
may be represented at a hearing by "any person of the
taxpayer's choosing."'"
Potential representatives are,
therefore, not limited to attorneys, accountants, or any sort of
recognized tax agent, and may indeed include persons such as
a political lobbyist or representative of a political action
committee if the taxpayer believes that sort of representation
will aid the taxpayer's case. The parties are allowed to
present witnesses, who may be called upon to testify under
oath at the discretion of the Board of Equalization chair or on
the request of a party. 145 Each party's witnesses are subject
to cross-examination by the other party, 146 and may also be
subject to cross-examination by Board of Equalization staff on
Board of
recognition by the chair of the Board."'
Equalization staff may also be permitted to explain the staffs
view of arguments and the value of evidence presented. 48
The Rules of Practice provide for the acceptance of any
evidence of the sort "on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs." 49 The
Rules indicate that the Board will be liberal in allowing the
presentation of evidence, but that objections to evidence will
be considered in assigning "weight" to the evidence. 50 The
rules add that the Board may "refuse to allow the
presentation of evidence that it considers irrelevant,
untrustworthy or unduly repetitious." 5 ' At the conclusion of
a hearing, the Board may decide the matter or take the

142. See id. § 5079.
143. See id. § 5079(b).
144. Id. § 5073(a). The Board or Board Staff may require the taxpayer to
grant a power of attorney to the taxpayer's representative on a form provided by
the Board. See id. § 5073(c).
145. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 18 § 5079(c)(1) (2007).
146. See id.
147. See id. § 5079(c)(2).
148. See id.
149. Id. § 5079(d). Hearsay evidence is specifically permitted. See id.
150. See id.
151. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 5079(d) (2007). Exhibits are accepted into
evidence on the motion of a party. See id. § 5079(e). If a party or a Board
Member objects to the submission, the matter is discussed and determined by a
vote of the Board. See id.
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matter under consideration for decision at a later meeting. 15 2
The Rules of Practice provide for written notification of the
Board's decision, but, with the exception of requests in
property tax cases, there is no requirement of written
findings. 15 3 Formal written opinions are drafted only at the
Board's direction 5 4 and are rare. The Board publishes its
opinions electronically and publishes general business tax
opinions in the Business Taxes Law Guide.'
Opinions also
are available in electronic legal databases and are maintained
by some commercial publishers.'5 6
The procedure is different for the business taxes that are
administered by the Board.'5 7
Tax assessments are
reviewable on the filing of a petition for redetermination to
the Board.158 Refund claims related to business taxes are
subject to the same procedure.159
The petition is first
considered at an appeals conference conducted by an appeals
attorney or appeals auditor who is a Board employee, but
independent of the assessing department. 160 The taxpayer is

152. See id. § 5081(a).
153. See id. § 5081.2.
154. See id. § 5182.1(a).
155. Formal and Memorandum opinions are listed by year on the Board of
Education
website
at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/legal/legalopcont.htm.
Memorandum opinions involving business tax issues, other than income and
franchise taxes, are published by the Board of Equalization in the Business
Taxes Law Guide, which is updated annually.
156. See, e.g., LexisNexis Electronic Database and California Tax Reporter
(Commerce Clearing House).
157. As listed in the Board's rules of practice, these include the Alcoholic
Beverage Tax, California Tire Fee, Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Fee,
Cigarette and Tobacco Products Tax, Diesel Fuel Tax, Emergency Telephone
Users Surcharge, Hazardous Substances Tax, Insurance Tax, Integrated Waste
Management Fee, Marine Invasive Species Fee Collection Law, Motor Vehicle
Fuel Tax, Natural Gas Surcharge, Occupational Lead Poisoning Prevention Fee,
Oil Spill Response, Prevention and Administration Fees, Sales and Use Tax,
Timber Yield Tax, Underground Storage Tank Maintenance Fee, and the Use
Fuel Tax. See tit. 18, § 5020(b).
158. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6561 (discussing sales tax
redeterminations) (Deering 2006). A petition for redetermination must be filed
within 30 days of the issuance of a determination that additional tax is due. See
id. A description of the appeals process for sales and use taxes and other
business taxes is provided in the Board of Equalization's publication, Appeals
Procedures - Sales and Use Taxes and Special Taxes. See State Bd. of
Equalization, Appeals Procedures, Sales and Use Taxes and Special Taxes,
Publ'n 17 (July 2004).
159. See tit. 18, § 5022.
160. See id. § 5023(a).
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permitted to waive appearance at the appeals conference,
which is thus voluntary, in which case the conference holder
16 1
may conduct the conference with the department alone.
The process concludes with the issuance of a decision and
Adverse
recommendation by the conference holder.'6 2
1 63
Equalization.
of
Board
the
to
appealable
decisions are then
In all matters other than appeals from actions of the
Franchise Tax Board, the Rules of Practice provide that
"hearings are not in the nature of trials or contests between
adverse parties. They are meetings of the Board at which the
taxpayer presents orally to the Board the taxpayer's
arguments for a reduction or cancellation of a tax liability...
"164 Nonetheless, the taxpayer and the assessing department
to
may offer witnesses at the hearing who may be required
1 65
testify under oath and be subject to cross-examination.
The Chief of Board Proceedings is empowered to "allocate
the hearing time for each party, including response time, and
reserve time for questions by the Board."16 A typical monthly
Board meeting, which usually encompasses one or two days,
will include discussion of legislative and regulatory proposals,
decisions in multiple cases on consent calendars, and
hearings in ten to fifteen (or more) cases.'67 Thus, although
the Board maintains rules that suggest an extensive hearing
Board
involving
Franchise
Tax
process
in cases
determinations, extensive deliberations in complex cases are
16
the exception rather than the rule. 1
Consideration of a case pending before the Board of

161. See id. § 5023(c).
162. See id. § 5023(e).
163. Id. § 5071(a).
164. Id. § 5078(b).
165. See tit. 18, § 5079(c).
166. Id. § 5077.
167. Agendas of the Board of Equalization can be found on the Web at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmeet04.htm.
168. See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative
Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1107
(1992). Professor Asimow states, "Similarly, the Board of Equalization hears
income and franchise tax cases en banc without any prior hearing officer
decision. Some attribute this inefficient procedure to the fact that the Board is
elected and wishes to demonstrate its responsiveness to the voters by hearing
every case regardless of importance. The result is a clogged agenda, rushed
proceedings, and a perception among tax professionals that the decisions are
made by staff rather than Board members." (Footnotes omitted.) Id.
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Equalization is not limited to the formal hearing process. As
elected politicians with a need to serve their constituents,
members of the Board are available for ex parte discussions
with litigants. 169 As a practical matter, most of the factual
and legal analysis of an appeal is undertaken by staff. Prior
to the end of the members' terms in January 2006, only one
member of the Board had any professional experience as a tax
expert prior to becoming a member of the Board of
Equalization. 17° That individual has since been elected as the
State Controller and, as a consequence, currently serves ex
officio as a member of the Board of Equalization and the
Franchise Tax Board.
Decisions of the Board of Equalization require a majority
vote of a quorum of the Board. 1 ' Three members of the
Board constitute a quorum. 72 Thus, a decision may be
rendered with the support of only two of the five members of
the Board of Equalization.
A majority of only two Board members recently decided
cases that ultimately involved the loss of millions of dollars of
tax liability to the State. In matters regarding LSI Logic
Corporation and Cypress Semiconductor Corporation, 7 3 by a
vote of two to one, the Board determined that a California
manufacturer's tax credit entitled the taxpayers to tax credits
refundable against both franchise taxes and sales taxes of
$3,895,018 and $926,635, respectively.174 One member of the

169. This issue was raised by proponents of Assembly Bill No. 2472 (20032004 Reg. Sess.) to create a California tax court. See infra text accompanying
note 268. It was also a point of concern raised by Assembly members at
legislative hearings.

See ASSEMB. COMM. ON REVENUE AND TAXATION,

ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 2427, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess., at 10 (2004).
170. Board member John Chiang. Mr. Chiang has a law degree from the
Georgetown University Law Center. He began his career as a Tax Law
Specialist with the Internal Revenue Service and served as an attorney with the
Office of the State Controller. State Controller John Chiang-Biography,
httpJ/www.sco.ca.gov/eo/controller/about/bio.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
171. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 18, § 5181(b) (2007).
172. See id. § 5072.
173. LSI Logic Corporation, 142330; Cypress Semiconductor Corporation,
173287,2003 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization,, 2003 Minutes of the
State Board of Equalization, Aug. 6, 2003, at 287, available at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/080603Min.pdf.
174. See id.; see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6902.2 (Deering 2006). The
statute provided that in lieu of claiming a credit against net income tax under
section 17053.49 or against sales tax under section 23649 for sales taxes paid on
certain manufacturing equipment, the taxpayer may "file a claim for refund
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Board was disqualified from participating because the
member owned stock in one of the parties. 7 5 The State
Controller was disqualified because of a campaign
contribution from Hewlett-Packard, which had the same issue
pending before the Board.'7 6 There is no formal opinion in the
case to disclose the Board's reasoning. Of the three members
deciding the case, one member was reported in the press as
stating that granting the refunds was important "to
encourage companies to invest in California," 7 a legitimate
policy goal, but not an appropriate factor in applying the law
Another member was reported as
to a specific case.
complaining about the "tally of givebacks . . . that day,"'
which is also not a ground for deciding individual cases. In
addition, the President Pro Tempore of the California Senate
attempted to affect the decision with a letter claiming that,
"misreading of this statute in favor of LSI Logic would result
in revenue losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars, as
other taxpayers would attempt to use the same inappropriate
interpretation to yield a sales tax refund on top of fully
utilized research credits."' 79
The State Legislature responded to the LSI Logic and
Cypress Semiconductor holdings with an amendment to the

equal to the credit amount that would otherwise be allowed pursuant to those
sections." See id. The provision added that any claim "shall be for an amount
not in excess of the amount of the credit that could have been used to offset
personal income or bank or corporation tax liability." See id. The claims before
the Board asked for refunds in excess of income tax liability. See 2003 Minutes
of the State Board of Equalization, supra note 173, at 287.
175. See

CAL.

GOV'T

CODE

§

15626(c)

(Deering

2006)

(prohibiting

participation under the Conflict of Interest Act). Board member John Chiang
announced that he owned stock in LSI Logic. See Nancy Vogel, Tax Panel Vote
is Costly, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at B1.
176. Controller Steve Westly is reported to have accepted a $10,000
contribution from Hewlett-Packard. See Vogel, supra note 175. Sections
15626(b) and (c) of the California Government Code require that any member of
the Board who has received contributions of $250 or more from a party or a
party's agent in the preceding twelve months disclose the contribution and not
participate in nor influence the decision. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15626(b), (c)

(Deering 2006). The Board staff is required to inquire into contributions by
parties and their agents and report on the record. See id. § 15626(h)(6). Where
the Deputy State Controller participates in lieu of the Controller, she is
required to disclose contributions to the Controller and disqualify herself from
the proceeding. See id. § 15626(g).
177. Vogel, supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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manufacturer's tax credit that indicated that the credit is not
refundable except to the extent of taxes paid and that the
80
revision is merely a declaration of existing law.1
Nonetheless, in December 2004, the Board awarded another
$5 million of refunds to three companies. 8 1 Notwithstanding
his Hewlett-Packard campaign contribution, Controller
Westly voted in favor of the refunds on this occasion and is
reported as saying that he received fourteen letters from
Democrats and Republicans in the State Assembly urging
8 2
Additional rationale for the
support for the refunds."
decision was expressed by Board Member Bill Leonard who is
quoted as saying that under the original law (as interpreted

180. California Senate Bill 1064 was amended by section 6902.2 of the
California Revenue and Tax Code to provide that the amount of the refund
"shall be for an amount not in excess of the amount of the credit that could have
been used to ...reduce the 'net tax' as defined in Section 17039, or the 'tax,' as
defined in Section 23036. Any credit carried over pursuant to Section 17053.49
or Section 23649 may not be refunded under this section until the credit carried
over could be applied to reduce the 'net tax' (as defined in Section 17039) or the
'tax' (as defined in Section 23036), as applicable. Under no circumstances may
any claim for refund exceed the 'net tax,' as defined by Section 17039, or the
'tax,' as defined by Section 23036, after the allowance of any credits authorized
by Section 17039 or 23036." See 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3682 (West) (amended
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6902.2 (Deering 2006)). Section 2 of the Income and
Corporation Appeals and Credits Act provides that amendments made by
section 1 of the act "are declaratory of existing law, but are effective for any
claims for refund filed with the State Board of Equalization on or after August
7, 2003." 2003 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3683 (West).
181. Conexant Systems, 1965556, received a refund of $4.1 million; Grundfos
U.S. Holding, 209694, received a refund of $624,450; and Lightwave Electronics,
223053, received a refund of $163,185. See 2004 Minutes of the Board of
available
at
377-78,
391,
2004,
at
Equalization,
Dec.15,
http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/121504M.pdf.
182. See Jim Wasserman, Firms that Paid no State Taxes Set to Get $82
Million in Refunds, RIVERSIDE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/nw/?postId=4065&pageTitle=Firms+that+pa
Note that the
id+no+state+taxes+set+to+get+%2482+million+in+refunds.
restraint on participating only applies to campaign contributions received in the
twelve-month period preceding the decision. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15626(b)

(Deering 2006). Michael Asimow recognized that, "This provision obviously
places a premium on making the contribution more than 12 months before the
matter comes on for decision." and describes the 12-month rule as a " huge
loophole" that "permits a member who has received a contribution requiring
disqualification to return the contribution and then participate in the decision..
. . Anecdotal evidence available to the author suggests this loophole is
frequently employed; the returned contribution can then be recontributed when
the member stands for reelection." Michael Asimow, The Influence of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act on California's New Administrative
ProcedureAct, 32 TULSA L.J. 297, 306 n.48 (1996).
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by the Board) companies were allowed credits against both
income and sales taxes and that companies understood that "I
should never lose one because I've taken advantage of the
other."1 8 3 Mr. Leonard added that the law "was designed to
give a tax break for a public purpose."" 4 In January 2005,
the Board followed these refunds with further grants totaling
$80.9 million to eighteen claimants including Intel and
Hewlett-Packard.18 5 As for the legal reasoning in these cases,
the press reported that the Board majority interpreted the
legislative revisions to the manufacturers' investment credit
"to justify the refunds. Others thought the intent was to
allow the tax board to continue hearing the companies' cases
but not automatically grant refunds.""8 6 This writer, and the
taxpayers of California, must rely on press accounts of the
Board's reasoning because the Board rarely publishes a
formal opinion in its tax cases, even where the case is
controversial, involves significant legal questions, or involves
large amounts of tax."8 7

183. Wasserman, supra note 182.
184. Id.
185. See 2005 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, Jan. 25, 2005, at
21-23, available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/102505M.pdf.
186. Kate Folmar, State's Big Tax Refunds Attacked, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 26, 2005.
187. The Board published a total of one opinion in 2004, three opinions in
2005, and five opinions in 2006. Board of Equalization formal opinions can be
found
through
the
Board's
web
sits
at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/legalllegalopcont.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). The
only indication of the Board's reasoning in the manufacturers' credit cases
comes from the self-published remarks of Board Member Leonard who wrote:
The other twist in the law is that the taxpayer could choose to take this
credit as a refund of their income taxes or a refund of their sales taxes.
Hundreds of companies have chosen to take this credit from their
income taxes without controversy. However, the government auditors
have resisted allowing taxpayers to take this credit against their sales
taxes. This is the substance of the so-called "give away." All these
companies paid their sales taxes. California, unlike many states,
charges full sales taxes on manufacturing equipment, which means
that to locate machinery in California you have to pay an average of 8%
OVER the purchase price in sales taxes. The credit law would have
given a 6% refund so the taxpayer never comes out ahead when
compared to other states. [$1 The Board of Equalization voted to honor
the credits against the sales taxes paid for these companies that have
chosen to expand their businesses in California despite all of our antibusiness laws and regulations. My premise is that taxpayers should
pay every penny they owe to the government, but I will help them to
make sure that they never pay one penny more than that.
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The immediate past chair of the Board, who was reported
to have delayed the decisions until she left the Board to
assume her position as a State Senator after the November
2004 elections, was quoted as describing the manufacturers'
credit refunds as "indefensible" and a "wholesale and
However, she was less
unforgivable tax giveaway."18 8
concerned about tax refunds when the case of one of her
constituents was involved. On its first hearing, the Board
voted 4-0 to deny a sales tax appeal of Century Theatres
involving $590,984 of sales tax on the sale of popcorn.18 9 The
case was re-heard by the Board as a claim for refund on
October 19, 2004.1° The Board approved the refund by a vote
of 2-1, with Board Members Midgden and Mandell (acting for
the State Controller) voting for the refund. 191 Century
Theatres is headquartered in the State Senate district in
which Board Chair Migden was running for office. 192 The
formal opinion in Century Theatres was adopted on November
4, 2004, two days after the November 2004 elections, with a
vote of 4-1 to grant the refund. 193 Sacramento Bee columnist
Dan Walters asserted that, "The chairwoman of the board,
Carole Migden, clearly had a change of attitude after some
Mr.
private meetings with Century executives . . . ."'1
Walters also states that the decision "underscores how

BILL

LEONARD,

THE

LEONARD

LETTER,

Jan.

3,

2005,

http://www.boe.ca.gov/leonard/blletters/pdf/010305letter.pdf.
188. Folmar, supra note 186.
189. See 2004 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, Feb. 18, 2004, at
31, available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/021804Min.pdf. The
staff position was supported by Board Members Midgden, Chiang, Leonard, and
Mandell. See id. Board Member Parrish abstained. See id.
190. See 2004 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, Oct. 19, 2004, at
306, 329, availableat http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/101904M.pdf.
191. See id. at 329. Board Member Chiang voted against the refund. See id.
Board Members Leonard and Parrish abstained. See id.
192. Century Theatres, Inc. corporate headquarters is located at 150 Pelican
Way, San Rafael, CA 94901, which is in the State Senate district represented by
Senator Migden.
193. 2004 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, Oct. 19, 2004, at 329,
available at http'//www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pubmins/101904M.pdf. Board
Member Chiang voted against the refund. See id. Board Members Leonard and
Parrish abstained. See id.
194. Dan Walters, Tax Panel's Change of Heart Pops Up and Helps Theaters,
at
available
8,
2004,
BEE,
Dec.
SACRAMENTO
http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/politics/columns/walters/story/11695656p12584486c.html.
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arbitrary state tax laws have become."'9 5
Sales tax
regulations impose sales tax on the sale of hot prepared food,
which is described as "those products, items, or components
which have been prepared for sale in a heated condition and
which are sold at any temperature which is higher than the
air temperature of the room or place where they are sold." 9 '
The Board's opinion describes Century Theatre's production
of popcorn as follows:
Claimant's process for making popcorn starts with a
popper. Kernels are placed in a suspended kettle where
the kernels are heated until they pop. Under the kettle is
a bin that holds the popcorn once it has popped. Next to
the popper machine is a machine called a "cornditioner."
The cornditioner includes a storage bin that stores popped
popcorn until claimant's employee scoops the popcorn into
a bag. Under the storage bin, the cornditioner also
includes a heating element and motor that blows air over
the heating element causing heated air to be blown
up
97
through the popcorn while it sits in the cornditioner.'
The opinion concludes that "claimant's cooking process has
not resulted in the sale of a hot prepared food product within
the meaning of the regulation.' ' 9 8
The Board majority
accepted the taxpayer's argument that the popcorn is served
at room temperature and is, therefore, not hot food.
Interpretation of the tax law also can vary by election
result. In Costco Wholesale Membership Co.,' 99 the Board
initially determined by a vote of 3-1 that the entire Costco
organization was subject to sales tax on sale of memberships
because membership fees purchased through its virtual store,
www.Costco.com, created a two-tier membership structure for
all Costco stores.200
Two members of the three-person
195. Id.
196. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 1603(e)(1) (2007).
197. CAL. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, IN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM FOR REFUND
UNDER THE SALES AND USE TAX LAW OF CENTURY THEATRES, INC. 1 (Nov. 4,

2004) (mem.).
198. Id. at 3.
199. Costco Wholesale Membership Co., 132058, 2002 Minutes of the State
Board of Equalization,Nov. 12, 2002, at 440, 2002 Minutes of the State Board of
Equalization,
Nov.
12,
2002,
at
438,
available
at
http://www.boe.ca.gov/meetings/pdf/111202.pdf.
200. See id. at 440; see R. Ayoob & Christopher J. Matarese, Univ. of S. Cal.
2004 Tax Inst., Current Developments in State and Local Taxation, at 5
(unpublished course materials Jan. 26, 2004). It is noteworthy, again, that the
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majority were replaced on the Board in the November 2002
elections (Messers Andal and Klehs were barred by termlimits from an additional term). In a subsequent claim for
refund, the newly elected Board members, Carole Migden and
Bill Leonard, joined Board Members Chiang and Mandell
(acting for Controller Westly) to grant a refund of sales taxes
collected on the Costco membership sales by concluding that
the two-tier membership pricing rules should be applied on a
store-by-store basis instead of on the basis of the company as
a whole. °1
When a taxpayer prevails in cases such as the
manufacturers excise credit cases, the sales tax on popcorn
decision, or the Costco membership fees, there is no avenue to
protect the interest of the State or its other taxpayers. The
Franchise Tax Board does not have an avenue of appeal for
Board decisions. In the sales and use taxes arenas, the Board
itself is not going to pursue an appeal of its own decisions.
Clearly, the prevailing taxpayer is not going to object to a
favorable ruling on its own appeal.
Thus, the general
taxpaying public, which is required to shoulder the burden of
lost revenue from arbitrary Board decisions, has no way to
protect its interests.
Indeed, because the Board rarely
publishes formal decisions in these cases, the general public
rarely has a mechanism to judge the actions of the Board.
3.

Beyond the Board of Equalization

In the event of an adverse decision from the Board of
Equalization in cases involving personal income or the
corporate franchise tax, the taxpayer must first file a claim
for refund with the Franchise Tax Board, pay the tax, then
file a suit for refund in the Superior Court. °2 As is the case

holdings of the Board of Equalization are generally only discoverable through
secondary sources, and sometimes only through obscure sources. Section 1584,
title 18, of the California Code of Regulations provides that membership fees are
part of gross receipts subject to sales tax when either the fee exceeds a nominal
amount or the retailer sells goods at a lower price to persons who have paid the
fee. See tit. 18, §1584. The regulation was amended in 2004 to add that the
fees are part of the gross receipts of the person selling tangible personal
property and that it is immaterial that the person selling the membership is not
the person who sells tangible personal property to the member. See id.
201. See 2002 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, supra note 199.
202. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19382 (Deering 2006). As noted in the text

accompanying note 130, the taxpayer has one year from the date of payment to
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with decisions by the Board of Equalization, although the
Superior Courts will make findings of fact and write
memoranda of their decisions, the material is rarely
published and is generally not available to provide a body of
interpretation of the California income tax provisions.
Decisions of the Superior Courts are appealable to the
California District Courts of Appeal, and from there to the
California Supreme
Court, which has discretionary
jurisdiction.
A taxpayer who obtains an adverse decision from the
Board of Equalization with respect to a petition for
redetermination of business taxes administered by the Board
must also pay the tax and file an action for a refund,
beginning with a claim for refund before the Board of
Equalization.2 °3 Although filing a claim for refund within the
required six-month period following an adverse decision 20 4 or
a petition for redetermination may seem redundant, as Costco
Wholesale, Co.2 5 and Century Theatres, Inc. 20 6 demonstrate,
the Board of Equalization is not above changing its view of
the same case, particularly if an election intervenes. Once
the claim for refund is denied, the taxpayer may proceed with
a suit for refund in the Superior Court.20 7
4.

20 8
The Almost ParallelFederalReview Procedure

Federal

tax returns

are

initially examined

at

an

file the claim for refund (or four years from the date the return was due,
whichever is later). See id. § 19306. The suit for refund must be filed within
ninety days after notice from the Franchise Tax Board on the claim for refund.
See id. § 19384. If the Franchise Tax Board fails to act on the claim for refund
within six-months, the taxpayer may then file the suit for refund in the
Superior Court. See id. § 19385. Alternatively, before filing suit, the taxpayer
may return to the Board of Equalization with an appeal from the Franchise Tax
Board's denial of a claim for refund. See id. § 19324, 19384. The taxpayer has
ninety days from the receipt of the Franchise Tax Board's notice of action to file
an appeal with the Board of Equalization. See id. § 19384. The taxpayer then
has ninety days from the date that the Board of Equalization's determination is
final to pursue an action for refund in the Superior Court. See id.
203. See e.g., § 6932 (applicable to sale and use tax determinations).
204. See § 6902.
205. See 2002 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization supra note 199.
206. See 2004 Minutes of the State Board of Equalization, supra note 193.
207. See, e.g., § 6932 (applicable to sale and use tax determinations).
208. This description of federal procedure is largely drawn from PAUL
MCDANIEL, MARTIN MCMAHON, DANIEL SIMMONS & ALICE ABREU, FEDERAL
INCOME TAxATION 24-34 (4th ed. 2004).
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administrative level within the Internal Revenue Service at
Regional Service Centers for mathematical errors and
through the District Directors' offices in the form of
of
(including
examination
correspondence
audits
discrepancies between information reporting and filed
returns) and more detailed "field audits." On failure to reach
an agreement with respect to taxes due, the District Director
will issue a so-called "thirty day letter"20 9 that gives the
taxpayer thirty days in which to either (1) file a formal
protest that moves the case to the Internal Revenue Service
Appellate Division,21 ° (2) request a Statutory Notice of
Deficiency 211 (a ninety-day letter) that allows the taxpayer to
proceed to the Tax Court, or (3) pay the tax.2" 2 The appeals
conference is an informal meeting with the Appeals Office
where the taxpayer can present additional information,
including witnesses, although additional evidence must also
be presented in the form of an affidavit.2 13 The Appeals
Officer has authority to settle a case on the merits and may
consider the hazards of litigation, but not the nuisance value
of the case.214 If no settlement is reached, the Internal
Revenue Service issues a Statutory Notice of Deficiency,2 " the
ninety-day letter, in which case the taxpayer has ninety days
in which to pay the tax or file a petition to the Tax Court for
review of the deficiency. There is a single process through
one administrative agency.
The Tax Court provides a vehicle for petitioning to set
aside the tax agency determinations in advance of payment of
the tax. The United States Tax Court, known as the Board of
Tax Appeals until 1942, is a quasi-judicial body created under
the legislative authority of Article I of the United States
Constitution, rather than the judicial authority of Article III
of the Constitution. Tax Court judges are appointed by the
President for fifteen-year terms 21 6 and are often reappointed
to office at the end of their term. Generally, Tax Court judges

209. I.R.C. § 7522(b)(3).
210. See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(b).
211. I.R.C. § 6212.
212. I.R.C. § 6213(a).

213.
214.
215.
216.

Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c).
Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f)(2).
I.R.C. § 6212.
See I. R. C. § 7443 (2000).
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are lawyers with significant tax experience from private
practice or government service. Trials in the Tax Court are
conducted by a single judge who issues findings of fact and an
opinion deciding the case. Decisions by a single judge may be
reviewed by the entire court as determined by the Chief
Judge. Decisions are issued either as published decisions,
which are officially published by the Tax Court, or
memorandum decisions that are not published by the court
and have less precedential value. Memorandum decisions
generally involve factual issues, or are decisions that involve
only previously decided legal issues. Decisions of the Tax
Court are appealable to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the taxpayer resides.21 7 The
Tax Court has a small claims procedure involving deficiencies
of $50,000 or less that provides an independent review to a
taxpayer with informal rules that do not require the expense
of a full scale trial. The taxpayer usually is not represented
by an attorney. Small claims cases are decided with a
summary opinion rather than formal findings of fact and
opinion, and are not appealable.
In lieu of the Tax Court procedure, the taxpayer may pay
the deficiency and file a claim for refund.2 18 After a refund
claim is denied by the Internal Revenue Service, or the
Service fails to act on the claim within six-months, the
taxpayer may file a suit for refund in either the United States
District Court for the district in which the taxpayer resides,2 9
or a suit for refund with the Court of Federal Claims.
Decisions by the District Court are appealable to the Circuit
Court of Appeals. 2 0
Decisions by the Circuit Courts of
Appeals, or by the Court of Federal Claims may be heard by
the United States Supreme Court under a writ of certiorari.
5.

So What's Wrong with the CaliforniaPicture?
a.

The Elected Tax Tribunal

California State Assembly Member Lois Wolk made the
217. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A). In the case of a corporation the appropriate
Circuit is the Circuit in which the corporation has its principal place of
business. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(B).
218. I.R.C. § 6511.
219. 28 U.S.C. §1402(a)(1).
220. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294.
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following statement in testimony before the California
Performance Review Commission:
The members of the Board [of Equalization] are politicians
who campaign for election every four years. They need to
raise millions of dollars in campaign contributions.
Unfortunately, significant campaign contributions have
come from entities who appear before the Board, such as
the accounting firm Price Waterhouse Coopers, who
circumvent conflict of interest rules by making
contributions through their own PACs. Frankly, it's
disgusting and an insult to honest taxpayers who have to
carry more than their fair share because others are better
connected or because 221
decisions were made based on
politics and not tax law.

Assembly Member Wolk is not the first to recognize the
problem. The 1929 Martin Commission said:
This great preponderance of appointed tax officials seems
to bear out the conclusion that neither elected nor ex
officio tax officials are desirable. Elected members are
subject to political pressure; ex officio members are
ordinarily occupied with other duties; and neither elected
nor ex officio members are apt to be chosen primarily for
their fitness for the task. 222
The Martin Commission report adds that, "The necessity
for highly specialized knowledge and the value of
accumulated experience in this work make a fairly long term
of office desirable- both to attract the able person and to
profit from his experience."223

The problem of an elected tax collector is self-evident.
Board members "tend to view themselves more as politicians
with responsibility to their constituents than as adjudicators
or rulemakers."2 24 The campaign slogan for an elected tax
collector might be, "Elect me and I will not collect taxes from
you (even if those taxes are due under the law)." 225

Former

221. Transcript of California Performance Review Commission, Government
Reorganization Meeting (Sept. 27, 2004) (statement of Assemb. Member Lois

Wolk).
222. CAL. TAX COMM'N, supra note 67, at 117 (footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 120.
224. Asimow, supra note 182, at 306.
225. Daniel L. Simmons, Letter to the Cal. Comm'n on Tax Policy for the
New Econ., Sept. 23, 2003, reprinted in CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE
NEW ECON., FINAL REPORT 77, app. D (2003).
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Board Member Claude Parrish came very close to this
advocacy where he listed as an accomplishment of his tenure
on the Board the fact that, "He has shown his responsiveness
to taxpayers by instituting an open door policy and is
responsible for increasing the percentage of relief received by
226
California taxpayers before the Board of Equalization.
Indeed, Mr. Parrish claims credit for demanding an
immediate vote on the hearing of taxpayer cases as he
asserted that, "The result of this practice is that more
taxpayers have received a favorable outcome. In 1999, thirtynine percent of taxpayers were granted relief; however in
2000, that percentage jumped to forty-one percent."227 While
Mr. Parrish might be commended for attempting to
streamline and improve tax dispute resolution, ideally the
goal of the decision-maker should be to fairly apply the law to
the facts of a particular case, rather than increasing the
percentage of taxpayer victories on appeal. In addition, while
reducing taxes collected by the State is an appropriate
position for an elected policy maker, there is an inherent
conflict between the executive function of the Board of
Equalization, which is to supervise the collection of numerous
taxes (and its concurrent role in developing tax policy and
making recommendations to the Legislature) and its role as a
quasi-judicial body in the determination of tax appeals.
b.

Separationof Powers

Government in the United States is typically divided
between executive, legislative, and judicial functions. All
three of these activities come together in the Board of
Equalization, which administers tax collection, proposes
legislation, adopts regulations (the latter being both a
legislative and executive function), and determines cases on
appeal from determinations in the course of its executive tax
collector role. The 1955 interim legislative report reflected on
this amalgamation of authorities as follows:
226. See Full Biography for Claude Parrish, Nov. 7, 2006 Election, Candidate
for
Treasurer,
http://www.smartvoter.org/2006/11/07/ca/state/vote/parrish-c/bio.html
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2007).
227. Id. Perhaps the trend towards snap judgment immediately following
the taxpayer's presentation is one of the reasons that formal written opinions in
Board action is so rare.
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The Board of Equalization is in the questionable position
of hearing appeals from its own administrative policies
and actions. This practice is contrary to the usual AngloAmerican philosophy of justice in which the taxpayer has
the privilege of appealing to some impartial agency
outside the sphere of influence of those whose decisions
are being appealed.2 2
With respect to hearing appeals from determinations
made by staff within departments of the Board of
Equalization, the interim committee report states:
It is perfectly evident that this situation exists, that it is
directly contrary to the best thought in judicial
procedures, and that it is unfair to the aggrieved
taxpayers of the State as a whole. In such a position, the
board must and does rely heavily upon staff
recommendations-recommendations which, of course,
come from the same staff whose findings are being
appealed ....
This condition is dangerous, particularly in
complicated disputes, both because the elective system
does not necessarily provide incumbents with any tax
background and because the many duties otherwise
saddled upon the board preclude time for ample study of
pending cases.2 29
A decade later similar findings led another interim
legislative study to recommend: "One of the essentials of good
tax administration is an adequate appeals process.
The
committee concludes that the tax appeals procedure should be
established independently from the administrative functions
of tax collection to insure a clear separation of authority. ''23°
A. Alan Post, the Legislative Analyst at the time, is
quoted in the 1965 report as testifying:

228.

SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOv'T ORG, supra note

57, at 18.
229. Id. at 19. In Union Pac. Railroad Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,, a
case involving property tax assessment methods of certain railroad property,
the court indicated that dual representation by a Board of Equalization staff
attorney, who represented staff at reassessment hearings and who directly
advised the Board by preparing proposed findings through ex parte
communications not available to the taxpayers, established a procedure that "is
fundamentally unfair, and should not be employed in any hearings on remand."
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 282 Cal. Rptr. 745, 755-56
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
230. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 10.

2008]

CALIFORNIA TAX COLLECTION

321

[W]e had recommended, and we would still recommend as
a model form of organization, that the tax appeals board
be one which would be appointed by the Governor. I am
prepared, however, to say that . . . it would seem to me
that there would be no harm whatsoever done to have the
as a Board of
present Board of Equalization reconstituted
23 1
Equalization.
of
Board
a
and
Appeals
Tax
The 1965 interim study committee concluded that, "the
tax appeals procedure should be established independently
from the administrative functions of tax collection to insure a
clear separation of authority easily understood by every
taxpayer."232 The committee's overall recommendation was
the creation of a department of revenue to take over all tax
collection responsibilities leaving the Board of Equalization
as the designated board of tax appeals.2 33 This solution, while
separating the executive and juridical functions, would leave
resolution of tax disputes in the hands of short-term elected
officials.
The problems inherent in the amalgamated tax structure
are exacerbated by the elective nature of the Board of
Equalization. On the one hand, the job of the tax collection
agency is to protect the State's revenue by collecting taxes
that are due under the laws enacted by the legislature and
signed by the Governor. An individual could campaign for the
Board of Equalization on a position that big corporations and
other big business, along with wealthy individuals, don't pay
enough taxes. Another individual may campaign for the
Board on the premise that taxes are bad for the California
As elected
economy because they stifle investment. 4
231. Id. at 40.
232. Id.

233. See id. at 10.
234. For example, Board Member Leonard states on his Board of
Equalization web site:
His service in the State Legislature has established Bill Leonard as
an advocate for fiscal responsibility, families, and quality public
education. He is also known for his efforts to improve the job and
business climate in the Golden State by lowering taxes, reducing
unnecessary regulation and providing incentives for job creation
and business expansion.
Biography,
Bill
Leonard
of
Equalization,
Board
http://www.boe.ca.gov/leonard/info/blbio.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2007). In a
subsequent iteration, Mr. Leonard states that, "[During his twenty-four years of
service in the State Legislature] he became well known as a fighter for low
taxes, quality schools and a better business climate .

. .

. He has fought for
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officials, the members of the Board of Equalization have a
legitimate policy role in the structure of the tax system that
may be influenced by these varying positions. The overall
position of the Board of Equalization can and does vary with
each election cycle as the philosophy of the majority changes
with new membership. That result is appropriate for the
Board in its executive and policy functions. However, when
these varying and changeable political views are brought to
the judicial function of deciding individual cases, the result is
an inconsistent jurisprudence that provides neither guidance
nor certainty to taxpayers planning transactions for the
future. In addition, the application of the elected member's
political philosophy to the decision of individual cases may
lead to results that are unfair either to the taxpayer or to the
State of California, and thereby unfair to all of the state's
taxpayers.2 35
c.

The Absence of InterpretativeGuidance

As noted above, the Board of Equalization's monthly
meeting agenda is filled with so many items that there is no
time for serious deliberation of any one case. Indeed, the
Board's tripartite role as executive, rule maker, and
arbitrator of disputes, leaves it with insufficient time to
adequately steward any of the functions. 236 This is apparent
in the paucity of formal decisions in tax cases. The absence of
formal decision leaves the Board free to arbitrarily decide
individual cases as the whim of the majority may choose. As

justice for taxpayers, advocated for taxpayer rights, and public accountability."
Id. These sentiments are similar to Mr. Leonard's reported comments as the
reason for his vote in the LSI Logic refund case. See supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
235. See Simmons, supra note 225.
236. The 1955 interim study complained that:
Adequate tax research is not and cannot be conducted within
California's present scattered tax administration structure. There is no
centralized tax research staff in California's tax administration
structure from which the Legislature and the Governor may obtain
comprehensive information as a basis for major tax policies. The need
for such research is particularly evident this year in view of the
proposals both for new taxes and for a comprehensive study next year
of our entire tax structure.
SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 57, at

15.
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the opposite results in Century Theatres, Inc.237 demonstrate,
even with the same membership, the Board's conclusions, in
the same case, under the same regulations, may vary from
appeal to claim for refund. The absence of formal opinions
The potentially
also creates uncertainty for taxpayers.
arbitrary nature of decision making, unrestrained by the
guiding light of precedent, and operating in the shadow of
unpublished reasoning, prevents taxpayer reliance on past
decisions. Reliance is impossible in the absence of Board
opinions explaining the Board's interpretation of the law.
The uncertainty in the application of California's tax law
is harmful to California's business environment in ways not
fully appreciated by pro-business advocates of taxpayer relief.
Business decisions to invest require an analysis of the afterAfter-tax return is a
tax return of the investment.
combination of before-tax returns, application of the relevant
Uncertainty
tax law, and the time value of money.238
regarding the application of the tax law adds an element of
risk that undermines the investor's ability to calculate its
after-tax return from an investment. This, in turn, will cause
the investor to demand a higher return, which may translate
into higher prices or lower investment.
d. Ex Parte Communications
The committee-meeting nature and informality of the
procedures before the Board of Equalization permit
procedures and access to board members by individual parties
to tax disputes that lead to decisions based on information not
developed in open meeting and unequal access to the tax
The problem with ex parte
determination process.
communication is summarized by Professor Asimow as
follows:
The rationale for a prohibition on ex parte contact is
familiar to all lawyers: it is deeply offensive in an
adversary system that any litigant should have an
opportunity to influence the decision-maker outside the
237. See discussion supra note 189.
238. MYRON S. SCHOLES, MARK A. WOLFSON, MERLE ERICKSON, EDWARD L.
MAYDEW & TERRY SHEVLIN, TAXES AND BuSINESS STRATEGY 1-2 (2d ed. 2002);

see also MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 208, at 244. On the other hand, hope
springs eternal that a taxpayer might beat the system and avoid tax liability
thereby increasing after-tax return.
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presence of opposing parties. The parties may spend
weeks or months conducting a detailed adjudicatory
hearing and an administrative judge may prepare a
painstakingly detailed proposed decision. Yet all this can
be set at naught by a few well-chosen words whispered
into the ear of an agency head or the agency head's
adviser. Ex parte contacts frustrate judicial review since
the decisive facts and arguments may not be in the record
or the decision. Finally, ex parte contacts contribute to an
attitude of cynicism in the minds of the public that
adjudicatory decisions are based more on politics and
undue influence than
on law and discretion exercised in
239
the public interest.
Professor Asimow also indicates that, "Ex parte contacts
between taxpayers
and the Board are said to be
commonplace, because Board members view such contacts as
a legitimate constituent service. "24
One commentator
knowledgeable in the workings of state government wrote:
Ex parte contact involves communication between a board
member and a taxpayer (or someone representing a
taxpayer) regarding an appeal before the board, without
the opportunity for all parties to participate in the
conversation. Retired staff involved in appeals before the
board cite numerous cases where they believe ex parte
communication was responsible for board decisions
contrary to prior decisions of the board or inconsistent
with prior case law, statute or regulation.24 '
The report adds:
[E]x parte communication sometimes puts staff at a
disadvantage because information is shared with board
members that is not shared with staff prior to the board
hearing. This makes it difficult for staff to respond to
undocumented assertions made "on the fly" at the hearing.
Combined with the fact that the [Franchise Tax Board]

239. See Asimow, supra note 168, at 1127.
240. Asimow, supra note 182, at 306.

241. B. Timothy Gage, California's Tax Administration Can be Improved
With or Without Consolidation of the State's Tax Agencies, at 4 (2005)

(unpublished report prepared on behalf of SEIU Local 1000 & SEIU California
Council)(on file with author). The report also notes that, "In many of these
cases the board's decision was also contrary to the summary prepared by staff,

which recommended against the taxpayer."

Id. at 20.

Mr. Gage was the

Director of Finance under Governor Gray Davis and, therefore, a member of the
Franchise Tax Board. See id. at About the Author and Sponsor Organizations.
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does not have power to compel taxpayers to respond to
requests for information, ex parte communication creates
an uneven playing field. 242

A footnote to this last statement indicates that:
In one instance, a taxpayer made assertions at the board
hearing that could not be contested by the FTB staff
because information requested from the taxpayer had not
Despite the information not being
been provided.
provided, the board ruled for the taxpayer. The taxpayer
243
reportedly had an ex parte contact prior to the hearing.
A fundamental principle of fair hearing and due process
is the concept that findings be based on the evidence in the
record of the adjudicative proceeding. That requires that "all
of the factual inputs that decision-makers consider be drawn
Ex parte
from the record produced at the hearing. "244
communication between taxpayers and Board members that
influences the decision in tax disputes deprives the taxpaying
public with assurance that the tax system is operated fairly.
The informality of Board hearings, ex parte contacts,
coupled with the absence of written opinions that are
precedent for future actions, creates an ad hoc decision
making environment that is prone to political pressure. The
decisions of an elected tax agency are as likely to be based on
political expediency and the personal beliefs of the elected
members as they are based on application of law to facts
found on the basis of evidence.
III. RESTRUCTURE CALIFORNIA TAX COLLECTION
1.

Consolidate CaliforniaTax Collection

The large collection of studies of California's tax
administration provides both a consistent call for
restructuring California's tax collection administration and
substantial guidance regarding the form that reform should
follow. The failure of all attempts to consolidate California's
tax collection agencies into a single entity, however, confirms
the political power of the vested interests in the elected Board
of Equalization. To repeat the language of the 1955 Assembly
242. Id. at 20.
243. Id. at 20, n.7.
244. Asimow, supra note 168, at 1126.
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Interim Committee on Government Organization:
[E]very comprehensive report on the subject that has been
made by objective, unbiased persons who were not part of
California's existing revenue administration structure
(and whose own positions would therefore not be affected)
has endorsed consolidation of the State's major revenue
agencies in some form or another. The committee knows
that has defended
of no comprehensive, independent study
2 45
the existing organization-or lack of it.
There are two themes that consistently appear in every
legislative and special commission study of the California tax
collection process. First, that confusing, overlapping, and
duplicative tax collection functions should be consolidated
into a single revenue agency.24 6 Second, enforcement of the
revenue laws is an executive function for which the Governor
should be held accountable subject to legislative oversight. 4 7
That means that the head of the revenue agency should be
appointed by the Governor subject to both confirmation and
removal by action of the legislature. As a corollary, the
concept of an elected tax collector is recognized as an
inherently bad idea.248 The earliest reviews of the California
tax collection enterprise called for the abolition of the Board
of Equalization. 249 Finally, although not as clearly reflected
in the legislative and commission studies, there is a fairly
consistent national recognition that the California Franchise
Tax Board is a highly effective (if not overly aggressive) tax
collection agency. This last point should provide guidance
regarding the direction that any restructuring should take.
The clearest of the cumulative list of recommendations
regarding California tax collection is that collection should be
The reasons for
consolidated into a single agency. 5 °
consolidation are detailed in the most recent study of the
issue, the California Performance Review,25 1 which cites the
existence of multiple agencies performing identical functions
in duplicative space, the absence of coordinated information
245. Supra note 88.
246. SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG, supra note

57, quoted at the beginning of this article.
247. See supra text at note 91.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
249. See CAL. TAX COMM'N, supra note 67, at xxiv.

250. See supra note 88.
251. CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 108.
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regarding particular taxpayers, and the confusion and
duplicative reporting requirements imposed on taxpayers who
are required to respond to the demands of multiple
agencies. 252 Although the Legislative Analyst concluded that
some duplication may be eliminated by consolidated
electronic filing, 253 the creation of an electronic filing system
itself requires coordination, which to-date has not been
achievable across multiple agencies. While the Legislative
Analyst concluded that the potential short-term costs of
consolidation pose a constraint on the activity, the Analyst's
assessment of a limited consolidation of payment and
documentation functions did not consider the potential long
term saving for individual taxpayers and California business
enterprise that could be achieved through coordinated
reporting through a single agency.
Taking the recommendations
of the California
Performance Review, 254 but treading further into the province
of the State Board of Equalization where the Performance
Review Commission feared to go,25 5 California taxes and taxlike fees should be collected by a single revenue department.
This includes sales and use taxes, state-assessed property
taxes, the insurance company tax,256 the variety of fees and
excise taxes collected by the Board of Equalization, the
individual income tax and the corporate franchise tax
collected by the Franchise Tax Board, vehicle license fees
collected by the Department of Motor Vehicles, and
employment taxes collected by the Employment Development
Department.
The difficult question is not whether consolidation of tax
collection is warranted.
The real issue, the overriding
political issue that dates back to the adoption of the corporate

252. See id. at 440-41.
253. See LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 115.
254. CAL. PERFORMANCE REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 108.
255. See supra text accompanying note 110. However, almost every other
committee or commission to examine the matter has called for elimination of
the Board of Equalization. See supra text beginning at note 61.
256. Of all of these taxes, only removal of authority over insurance company
taxation would require an amendment of the California constitution. The
remainder of these taxes is assigned to the Board of Equalization by statute.
The gross premiums tax on insurance companies is assessed jointly by the
Insurance Commissioner and the Board of Equalization and is collected by the
State Controller. See supra note 85.
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franchise tax,25 7 is who is to be in charge. The consistent
answer by almost all of the studies that recognize tax
collection as an executive function is to house the tax
collection agency with the Governor.258 Thus, following the
1965 recommendation of the Assembly Interim Committee on
Government Organization, 259 a Department of Revenue
should be directed by an individual appointed by the
Governor with Senate confirmation, and removable for cause
by the Legislature. While not explicit in the report, such a
director should serve at the will of the Governor to whom he
or she is responsible.
California, however, is a place where numerous executive
functions that may be charged to gubernatorial appointees
are performed by elected officials. Thus, Californians elect
the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the State
Recognizing the
Controller, and the State Treasurer.
diffusion of executive authority in state government, a second
best solution might encompass appointing the director of a
revenue agency by a "Tax Commission" consisting of the
Governor, the Controller, and the State Treasurer.2 6 °
Finally, the organizational structure of a department of
revenue should begin with the existing structure of the
Franchise Tax Board under its director and management.
Collection functions spread across the agencies can be folded
into the department of revenue as divisions reflecting each of
the separate tax areas. Thus, the department would contain
divisions responsible for individual income tax, the corporate
franchise tax, sales and use taxes, various excise taxes,
employment taxes, insurance taxes (if included through
constitutional revision), etc. A single division for collection
and data management could cut across these divisions to
coordinate reporting for individual taxpayers through
This last consolidation is the most
combined accounts.
Importantly,
taxpayers.
for
efficiency
significant
257. See supra text accompanying and following note 52.
258. See supra note 87.
259. See ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 43,

discussed in the text accompanying note 89.
260. This solution in part mirrors the existing Franchise Tax Board where
the Governor is represented by the Governor's Finance Chief.

The other

members are the State Controller and the Chair of the Board of Equalization.
See CAL.

PERFORMANCE

recommendation.

REVIEW

COMM'N, supra note

108, for another
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consolidation would enhance compliance and enforcement
through consolidated data management.2 6 1
2. Reform the Tax Adjudication Process
The process for adjudication of tax disputes in California
is a horror story.26 2 A restructuring of the California tax
dispute resolution structure would be a major step forward
towards making the California tax environment friendlier to
residents and investors. Indeed, reformation of the dispute
resolution mechanism may be a more important reform than
consolidating the tax agencies.
Currently, there is no
consistent body of interpretative law on which taxpayers may
rely in planning their affairs. Compounding the absence of
written guidance is the fact that interpretations change as
the make-up of the elected dispute resolution body changes.
261. This last issue is a magnet for opposition to consolidation by tax
avoiders who might hide some activities from some but not all of the existing
disparate tax agencies.
262. See e.g., Professor Asimow's article, which describes the California tax
adjudication process as follows:
SBE's system of adjudication is primitive. For example, the 5-member
Board hears every income tax case en banc. It has a rudimentary
system of hearing officers who hear business tax cases; however, it has
staunchly rejected classification of these hearing officers as ALJs
[administrative law judge] (apparently because reclassification would
give them a pay increase). Ex parte contact between taxpayers and
Board members is said to be commonplace, because Board members
view such contacts as a legitimate constituent service. Additionally,
Board members decide cases of persons who have contributed to their
campaigns, and separation of functions is largely ignored. The SBE
believes in a true institutional method: its advocates engage in offrecord discussions with both hearing officers and Board members about
specific cases. (Footnotes omitted.)
Asimow, supra note 182, at 306-07.
In another article, Professor Asimow states:
To put it charitably, California's present arrangement for adjudicating
tax cases is a patchwork that can be understood only as a series of
historic accidents; to put it less charitably, the system is a mess.
Under that system, the Franchise Tax Board and State Board of
Equalization have overlapping membership, SBE has adjudicatory
power both over the income and franchise taxes imposed by FTB and
over the business taxes imposed by itself, SBE members are elected
and must solicit campaign contributions, and judicial review of SBE
decisions is available only after a taxpayer pays the tax and sues for a
refund. The initial hearing in franchise tax cases is before the SBE, en
banc; the initial hearing in business tax cases is before a hearing officer
whose powers and responsibilities are presently in sharp dispute.
Asimow, supra note 168, at 1165, n.334.
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Consistency of result and some assurance that equally placed
taxpayers and investors are receiving equal treatment with
regularly disclosed analytical resolution of tax disputes would
add a significant dose of credibility to California tax
collection.
The 2003 report of the California Commission on Tax
Policy in the New Economy recommended that "California...
establish a state administrative body to operate like the U.S.
tax court. This body would resolve all tax disputes, including
personal income tax, corporate income tax, sales and use tax,
property taxes, payroll taxes, and excise taxes ...
263
Appeals from final administrative tax assessments would be
heard by a board of tax appeals before the taxpayer would be
required to pay the assessment.2 64 Appeals from decision of
the board of tax appeals would be directed to the California
Courts of Appeal. 265 Decisions could be appealed by both the
taxpayer and the tax collection agency.2 66 The Commission
described its proposal as follows:
The overriding theme of the proposal is conformity with
federal procedures. Also, the creation of a state tax body
should shorten the dispute-resolution process by reducing
the number of steps needed to resolve a case. The system
would not be duplicate; one level of administrative appeal
and the hearing before the Board of Equalization could be
eliminated. In addition, this proposal would reduce the
need for staff at the Board of Equalization to find facts
and draft decisions proposed for Board adoption. Some of
the staff might be shifted to the tax body. Overall, an
administrative tax body would create efficiencies in the
decision making process that could result in cost savings
to the State. 267
The recommendations
of the Commission were
incorporated into a 2004 legislative proposal by California
Assembly Member Lois Wolk.265 Similar legislative proposals
263. CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE NEW ECON., supra note 225, at 4.
The recommendation was based on an appearance before the Commission by
the author and a letter dated September 23, 2003, supra note 225. The letter is
reproduced as an appendix to the report and a copy is in the author's files.
264. CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE NEW ECON., supra note 225, at 35.

265.
266.
267.
268.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 34.
Assemb. B. 2472, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), as introduced
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for a Board of Tax Appeals were introduced in 1994 by
Senator Quinton Kopp and Assembly Member Willie
Brown.2 69
The creation of an independent administrative tax
tribunal would not necessarily affect the alternate route for
review by payment of the tax, filing a claim for refund,
followed by a suit for refund in the Superior Court. Thus, as
in the Federal system, the creation of an administrative tax
tribunal for California could leave taxpayers with the option
of pursuing a refund claim through a judicial tribunal.
The
Commission provided
an example of an
administrative court with five administrative law judges.27 °
The proposal for an administrative court is similar to the
United States Tax Court, which is not a judicial court.2 71 The
recommendation for an administrative law court, rather than
a judicial court, is based on opposition from California judges
to fragmentation of the court system by the creation of
specialty courts.27 2 In addition, the State and Local Tax

Feb. 19, 2004. After receiving do pass recommendations from the Judiciary
Committee and the Revenue and Taxation Committee, the bill was referred by
the Rules Committee to the Appropriations Committee where it was held in
suspense until the end of the session and never acted upon by the Assembly.
See Assembly Bill History, Assemb. B. 2472, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
The author worked with Assembly Member Wolk and her staff in drafting this
legislation.
269. See S.B. 87, 1992-1993 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993); Assemb. B. 3820, 19931994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994).
270. See CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE NEW ECON., supra note 225, at
34.
271. See id. at 34; see also text accompanying note 216. California assembly
bill number 2472 would have referred to the tax tribunal as the California Tax
Court. See Assemb. B. 2472, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). Even the use of
the term "court" generated opposition from representatives of the Judicial
Council of California.
272. See Letter from William C. Vickrey, Admin. Dir. of the Courts, Judicial
Council of Cal., to the Cal. Comm'n on Tax Policy in the New Econ. (Nov. 6,
2003) (on file with author). The Judicial Council opposition did not apply to the
creation of an administrative tribunal. See also Garland Allen & Craig B.
Fields, The Model State Administrative Tax Tribunal Act: Fairness for all
Taxpayers, in 10 THE STATE & LOCAL TAX LAWYER 83, 88-89 (2005) (noting that

the model act drafted by the State and Local Tax Committee of the American
Bar Association, Section of Taxation, would create a tax tribunal in the
executive branch of state government because of the practical difficulties
encountered with respect to attempts to establish a specialized judicial
tribunal). Some critics of the proposal for an independent tribunal complain
that the tax tribunal would not be a judicial court capable of resolving
constitutional issues.
See Wm. Gregory Turner, General Counsel and
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Committee of the Tax Section of the American Bar
Association asserts that formation of tax tribunals within the
executive branch of state government has been effective.2 73
Only six states have established judicial branch tax tribunals,
while executive branch tax tribunals exist in twenty-four
states.2 7
Consideration of the objections to creation of a specialized
tax tribunal in the course of hearings on Assembly Member
Wolk's proposed tax court legislation helps to strengthen the
argument in favor of the tax tribunal.
a. Appellate Review
The California Commission on Tax Policy recommended
that decisions of the tax tribunal be reviewed by the Courts of
Appeal.2 75
Assembly Bill 2472 would have provided for
appellate review by the Court of Appeal for the appellate
Legislative Dir., Cal. Taxpayers' Ass'n. (Cal-Tax), Letter to Assemb. Member
Lois Wolk in Opposition to A.B. 2472, at 2 (Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Turner Letter].
But see infra, text accompanying note 321.
Establishment of a specialized court is opposed by a group called Consumer
Attorneys of California. See Bruce Brusavich, President Consumer Attorneys of
Cal., Letter to William Rosendahl, Chairman, Cal. Comm'n on Tax Policy in the
New Econ. (Nov. 12, 2003) (on file with author). In ballot arguments California
Chief Justice Phil Gibson is quoted as opposing adoption of California Assembly
Constitutional Amendment number 39 (1946) (Proposition 5), which would have
created a three-judge tax appeals court with appellate jurisdiction to hear
appeals from superior courts and tax agencies on the grounds that, "there is no
need for the so-called tax court, either as an appellate court or as a substitute
for the superior court; the adoption of the amendment would result in a sheer
waste of manpower and money, and serve only to complicate our judicial system
and confuse and inconvenience litigants and attorneys." Hastings Law Library,
University of California Hasitings, California Propositions Data Base,
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/10909/calprop.txt.
This
proposition was rejected by the voters, Yes: 586,412 (28.7%); No: 1,458,568
(71.3%). Id.
273. See Allen & Fields, supra note 272, at 89.
274. See id. Allen and Fields indicate that judicial tax tribunals have been
established in Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, New Jersey, and Oregon.
Allen and Fields add:
The track record of executive branch tax tribunals over the last 35
years is impressive, demonstrating that such forums can efficiently
achieve the Model Act's principal goals. Tribunals in states such as
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan and New York have operated
successfully for many years and have earned a reputation for fairness
and for tax expertise.
Id.
275. See CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE NEW ECON., supra note 225, at
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judicial district in which the proceeding originally arose.2 76
The legislation would have directed the appellate court to
apply a substantial evidence test under which the appellate
court would apply its independent judgment to findings of
fact only if the findings of the tax tribunal were not supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole,
and to apply its independent judgment as to questions of law
and fact.277
There appears to be little question that the legislature
has authority to provide for primary appellate review of
administrative decisions by the Court of Appeals. However,
questions of the scope of permissible judicial appellate review
of the decisions of an administrative tax tribunal have been
central to the discussion of legislative proposals.
An
examination of the evolution of the view of the California
Supreme Court regarding appellate review of administrative
action makes it clear that legislation directing review of the
decisions of an administrative tax tribunal by the appellate
courts is permissible.
In Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization,278 the
California Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding a
statutory provision 279 providing for review of decisions of the
State Board of Equalization under sections of the California
Code of Civil Procedure governing writs of certiorari, or writs
of review, the courts had no jurisdiction to issue the writ to
review a decision of the Board of Equalization.2 8 0 The Court
reasoned that the writ of review would lie only to review the
exercise of a judicial function2 8 ' and that the State legislature
did not have the power to confer judicial power on a state276. See Assemb. B. 2472, § 33, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), (adding
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25182(a)).
277. See id. (adding CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25182(b)(1) and (2)).

278. Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 557 (1936).
279. Retail Sales Act, ch. 1020, § 33, 1933 Cal. Stat. 2599, 2611.
280. See Standard Oil Co., supra note 278, at 565. A thorough discussion of
the Standard Oil decision and judicial review of administrative action can be
found in Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of
California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1995). Professor
Asimow notes that the Standard Oil decision "set off a torrent of academic
criticism and ridicule" and cites numerous articles and judicial opinions
questioning the judgment. See id. at 1165 n.20; see also Ralph N. Kleps,
CertiorarifiedMandamus, 12 STAN. L. REV. 554 (1960).
281. Standard Oil Co., supra note 278, at 565, citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §

1068 (Deering, 2006).
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wide administrative agency.2 82 Subsequently, in Drummey v.
State Board of FuneralDirectorsand Embalmers,8 3 the Court
held that "in the absence of a proper statutory method of
review, mandate is the only possible remedy available to
those aggrieved by administrative rulings of the nature here
involved."28 4 The Court in Drummey also held that the
reviewing court must exercise its independent judgment on
the facts, but that the courts "can and should be assisted by
the findings of the [administrative agency]."25 The Court
suggested that in reviewing a determination of a quasijudicial agency the court "must weigh the evidence, and
exercise its independent judgment on the law, if the
complaining party is to be accorded his constitutional rights
under the state and federal Constitutions."2 6
In 1946, the California legislature reacted to Standard
Oil and Drummey with the enactment of California Code of
Civil Procedure section
1094.5, which provides for
administrative
mandamus
to
review
decisions
of
administrative agencies in which a hearing is required.2 7
The scope of the inquiry includes questions whether the
agency has proceeded without, or in excess of its jurisdiction,
whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was an
abuse of discretion.2 8 The statute does not clearly specify the
standard of review. Section 1094.5(c) provides:
Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by
the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by
law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence,
abuse of discretion is established if the court determines
that the findings are not supported by the weight of the
evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is
established if the court determines that the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the

282. See Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d at 559.
Section 1 of Article VI of the California Constitution vests the judicial power in
the courts. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
283. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Dirs. & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d 75
(1939).
284. Id. at 82. The case involved an action to set aside an administrative
license suspension. See id. at 78-79.
285. Id. at 85.
286. Id. at 84.
287. See Act of June 15, 1945, ch. 868, § 1, 1945 Cal. Stat. 1636.
288. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b) (Deering 2006).
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The California Supreme Court addressed the scope of
2 90 holding that under Code
review question in Bixby v. Pierno,
of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 the courts could apply the
substantial evidence test to review a decision of the
Commissioner of Corporations' approving a corporate
The Court observed that the
reorganization plan.29 1
separation of powers doctrine embodied in Article III of the
State Constitution establishes a system of checks and
balances under which the judicial power empowers the courts
to protect fundamental rights.2 92 In the words of the majority
opinion of Justice Tobriner:
By carefully scrutinizing administrative decisions which
substantially affect vested, fundamental rights, the courts
of California have undertaken to protect such rights, and
particularly the right to practice one's trade or profession,
from untoward intrusions by the massive apparatus of
government. If the decision of an administrative agency
will substantially affect such a right, the trial court not
only examines the administrative record for errors of law
but also exercises its independent judgment upon the
evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.293
As to the application of the standard of review under
section 1094.5, Justice Tobriner added:
The courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether an
administrative decision or class of decisions substantially
affects fundamental vested rights and thus requires
independent judgment review. As we shall explain, the
courts in this case-by-case analysis consider the nature of
the right of the individual: whether it is a fundamental
and basic one, which will suffer substantial interference
by the action of the administrative agency, and, if it is
such a fundamental right, whether it is possessed by, and
vested in, the individual or merely sought by him. In the
latter case, since the administrative agency must engage
in the delicate task of determining whether the individual
qualifies for the sought right, the courts have deferred to
the administrative expertise of the agency. If, however,
289. Id.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130 (1971).
See id. at 134.
See id. at 141.
See id. at 142-43.
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the right has been acquired by the individual, and if the
right is fundamental, the courts have held the loss of it is
sufficiently vital to the individual to compel a full and
independent review. The abrogation of the right is too
important to the individual
to relegate it to exclusive
294
administrative extinction.
Justice Burke added in a concurring opinion that:
UlIt is apparent that practical necessity precludes
continued reliance upon a strict separatist theory of
government.
The rapid technological growth and
economic expansion which resulted in the creation and
proliferation of administrative agencies likewise has
placed ever-increasing burdens upon the judiciary. Only
the most compelling reasons should lead us to perpetuate
the uneconomic duplication of effort inherent in an
independent judgment review.
Likewise, there is no
justification whatsoever for permitting the courts to ignore
or overrule the administrative decisions of statewide
agencies whose experience and expertise best qualify
them, and not the courts, to make those decisions. From
the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that the separation
of powers doctrine does not afford a firm basis for
sustaining the independent judgment rule. Therefore, I
would conclude that the provisions of the California
Constitution do not forbid the administrative exercise of
such
quasi-judicial functions
as making factual
determinations which are binding upon the courts if
295
supported by substantial evidence.
The Court took a step towards Justice Burke's position in
Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor
2 96 where
Relations Board
the Court accepted a legislative
mandate for appellate court review of a quasi-judicial
administrative finding applying the substantial evidence
test.2 97 The majority opinion commented on Justice Burke's

294. Id. at 144 (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 156 (Burke, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
296. Tax-Cal Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 24 Cal. 3d 335
(1979).
297. The holding was repeated in Frink v. Prod, where the Court described
its opinion in Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. by saying:
Pointing out that none of the earlier cases had invalidated a statute
providing that administrative findings were conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence, the court in Tex-Cal held that 'the Legislature may
accord finality to the findings of a statewide agency that are supported by
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opinion in Bixby v. Pierno describing the opinion as calling for
a uniform application of the substantial evidence test and
adding:
The majority opinion expressed two reasons for rejecting
the dissent. First it pointed out that section 1094.5 was
intended to leave to courts the establishment of standards
for deciding which cases require independent judgment
and which substantial evidence review. ("In view of this
judicial history, the court would now assert a doubtful
prerogative if it were to rule that no cases at all require an
independent judgment review, and that the Legislature
created an empty category in section 1094.5.") ....
Second, the majority opinion urged that independent
judgment review be retained because it may help cure due
process violations at the administrative level.
Those two reasons for rejecting the dissent imply that a
statute might pass constitutional muster if it were to (1)
provide for judicial review of fact findings only by the
standard whether they are supported by substantial
record, and (2)
evidence in the light of the whole
298
guarantee administrative due process.
Importantly, the Court, in Tex-Cal Land Management,
Inc., adopted Justice Burke's view of the scope of the
constitutional mandate. The Court indicated that language
in its earlier cases "that described constitutional limitations
on legislative power was unnecessary to the holdings, which
could as well have been grounded in judicially fashioned rules
of procedure or in interpretation of section 1094.5. "1299

The

out that, "none of the cases

that

Court also pointed

commenced in 1936 with Standard Oil . . . and continued
through Bixby . . ., as well as later cases, invalidated any

legislative command that findings be conclusive if supported
The Court confirmed the
by substantial evidence.""'
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole and are made
under safeguards equivalent to those provided by the [Agricultural Labor
Relations Act] for unfair labor practice proceedings, whether or not the
California Constitution provides for that agency's exercising "judicial
power." Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal. 3d 166, 173 (1982).
298. Id. at 344. The majority opinion in Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc.
mistakenly refers to Justice Burke's concurrence in Bixby v. Pierno as a dissent.
The majority's page citation to Justice Burke's opinion is a clear reference to his
concurring opinion.
299. Id. at 345.
300. Id. (citations omitted). Professor Asimow thus asserts that, "As a result
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legislative mandate in the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Act for direct judicial review of orders of the Labor
Relations Board by the Court of Appeal applying the
substantial evidence testA0 1 The Court in Tex-Cal Land
Management, Inc. specifically states that "a mandate
proceeding initiated in an appellate court is a constitutionally
permitted
vehicle
for reviewing
an administrative
3
°
2
determination."
The Court described its ruling as follows:
We therefore hold that the Legislature may accord finality
to the findings of a statewide agency that are supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
and are made under safeguards equivalent to those
provided by the ALRA for unfair labor practice
proceedings, whether or not the California Constitution
provides for that agency's exercising "judicial power." Our
holding does not, of course, affect review of administrative
findings where the Legislature has left the choice of
standard to the courts (e.g., as in § 1094.5). 303

of Tex-Cal, the way is open for the courts or the legislature to design a modern
instrument for judicial review of adjudicatory action and to either abolish the
independent judgment test or shrink the circle of cases to which it applies."
Asimow, supra, note 168, at 1170.
301. Section 1160.8 of the California Labor Code provided in part that:
Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of
such order in the court of appeal having jurisdiction over the county
wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been
engaged in, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, by
filing in such court a written petition requesting that the order of the
board be modified or set aside . .

.

. The findings of the board with

respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.
302. Tax-Cal Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 24 Cal. 3d 335,
350 (1979). The court also prevaricated regarding the application of its holding
in Standard Oil v. Board of Equalization with respect to availability of the writ
of review stating simply:
Is the writ of review available only as to orders made in the exercise of
"judicial power?" . .. We need not decide that question here, for if the
writ of review is unavailable, the functions assigned a Court of Appeal
by section 1160.8 are within its original jurisdiction over a proceeding
"for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus."
Id.
303. Tex-Cal Land Mgmt., Inc., 24 Cal.3d at 346. As to the requisite
standards of due process, the court points to safeguards in the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (0). The court states:
The ALRA incorporates procedural safeguards of the NLRA including
the separation of prosecutorial from adjudicatory functions (§ 1149; cf.
29 U.S.C. § 153(d)), notice, written pleadings, evidentiary hearings (§
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Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. thus explains that the
legislature may provide for appellate review of the actions of
a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal by mandamus
Tex-Cal Land
applying the substantial evidence test.
Management, Inc. and Bixby v. Pierno also indicate that the
must be structured with
proceeding
administrative
safeguards to provide a fair hearing based on principles of
adequate due process. The structure of a tax court provided
by the proposed model tax court legislation of the American
Bar Association, Section of Taxation, State and Local Tax
Indeed, the
Committee, fulfills these requirements. °4
proposed model act contemplates an adjudicatory procedure
that contains more safeguards than the current review
The summary
process of the Board of Equalization.
model
act
states:
of
the
proposed
explanation
Basic fairness demands that a taxpayer be allowed to
make his case against an assertion of tax liability before
an independent adjudicatory body with tax expertise. And,
except in unusual situations, a taxpayer challenging a tax
determination should not be required to pay the amount
an
in dispute, or post a bond, as a condition to receiving
30 5
initial hearing before an unbiased, adjudicatory body.
The basic procedural safeguards proposed by the draft
model act are consistent with the recommendation of the
306
California Commission on Tax Policy in the New Economy
and Assembly Member Wolk's 2004 proposed legislation. 7
Principal features of the administrative tax tribunal proposed
by the model act include the following:
0 The tax tribunal would be separate and independent

1160.2; cf. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)), and a requirement that orders be
accompanied by findings based on the preponderance of the reported
evidence (§ 1160.3; cf. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c)). To make full use of the
board's expertise and to minimize delay from judicial review, both the
ALRA and the NLRA provide for direct review of board orders by
appellate courts and require that findings be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. (§ 1160.8; cf. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 160(e), 160(f).)
Id.
304.
2005).
305.
306.
307.

See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT (Proposed Draft Jan. 18,
Id. at 2.
See CAL. COMM'N ON TAX POLICY IN THE NEW ECON., supra note 225.
See Assemb. B. 2472, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), supra note 268.
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from the agencies responsible for collecting the tax,30 8
* Judges would be appointed by the Governor with the
30 9
consent of the Senate for a specified term of years,
" Judges will be required to have "substantial
knowledge of the tax law and substantial experience
making the record in a tax case suitable for judicial
l°
review,
* Judges will be expected to devote full-time to the
duties of the tax tribunal and shall not be permitted to
engage in other employment,3 1 '
* Subject to separate provisions for filing a claim for
refund, the tax tribunal would have jurisdiction for
hearing and determination of questions of law and fact
under the tax laws regulating payment of taxes or
assessments over which the tax tribunal is given
jurisdiction,3 12
* A taxpayer would commence a proceeding before the
tax tribunal within ninety days following receipt of a
notice of assessment from the revenue agency, with
provisions for an answer filed by the revenue agency
and further reply briefs from the taxpayer,3 13
* The tribunal would encourage informal discovery and
stipulations to agreed facts, but the tribunal would
also provide procedures for parties to obtain discovery
through production of books and records, written
interrogatories, and depositions, 1 4
* Tax cases would be heard in a trial de novo in a public
session with rules of evidence that permit relevant
evidence, including hearsay, "if it is probative of a

308. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 2(b).

309. See id. § 3(b).
310. See id. § 4(a).
311. See id. § 4(c). Members of the California State Board of Equalization
are prohibited from receiving compensation from a lobbyist or lobbying firm or
from a person who has within the past 12 months been under contract with the
agency. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 14(a). Board members are also prohibited
from accepting any honorarium. See CAL. CONST. art. V, § 14(b). Section 15603
of the California Government Code requires members of the Board to devote
full-time to the duties of the office. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15603 (Deering
2006).
312. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 7(a).

313. See id. § 9(a)-(c).
314. See id. §§ 11(a)-(c).
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material fact in controversy,3 1 5
* The taxpayer would have the burden of persuasion by
a preponderance of the evidence except in cases of
fraud or other cases where the burden is shifted by
law to the revenue agency,31 6
* The tax tribunal would be required to render a
decision in writing with a concise statement of the
facts found and the applicable law within six-months
after submission of the matter for decision,317
* Decisions of the tax tribunal would be enforced in the
same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court,3 18
and
* The Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a taxing
statute subject to contest in one case shall be
followed by the Tax Tribunal in subsequent cases
involving the same statute, and its application of a
statute to the facts of one case shall be followed by
the Tax Tribunal in subsequent cases involving
similar facts, unless the Tax Tribunal's
interpretation or application conflicts with that of
an appellate court or the Tax Tribunal provides
prior
reasons
for
reversing
satisfactory
precedent.1 9
In contrast, the administrative hearings before the Board
of Equalization do not provide for decisions by persons
independent of the tax collecting agency, the decision makers
are elected public servants with short and limited terms, the
decision makers are not required, and indeed generally do not
have any experience with the tax law, nor are the members of
the Board of Equalization necessarily skilled in the creation
of a record suitable for judicial review. With the rare
exception of an occasional written opinion, the only record of

315. See id. §§ 12 (a)-(d). The Model Act would expressly provide that the tax
tribunal would not be bound by rules of evidence applicable in civil cases. The
Act would also permit the tax tribunal to exclude evidence that is irrelevant and
unduly repetitious. See id. § 12(d).
316. See id. § 12(g).
317. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 13(a), (b) (Proposed

Draft Jan. 18, 2005).
318. See id. § 13(e).
319. Id. § 13(f). This, of course, would be a major improvement over the
decision making of the Board of Equalization, which rarely publishes decisions,
and which, therefore, has no precedential value for future reference.
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Board decisions provided for either judicial or public review
are brief notations in Board minutes.
Furthermore, the
judicial review process, available only as a refund claim
following full payment of the tax, does not provide a hearing
before a judge with expertise in tax matters. The Board of
Equalization is not required, and often does not render a
written decision, and, especially in the absence of written
decisions analyzing the law and facts of a case, the Board
does not apply its interpretation in one case to subsequent
decisions. Cases reviewed by the Superior Courts are not
much different in that at the trial-court level decisions on
claims for refund generally are not available as guidance for
future litigants.
In terms of the quest for adequate
safeguards and due process addressed by the Court in Bixby
v. Pierno,2 ° the creation of an independent administrative
tribunal to resolve tax disputes would provide a vast
improvement over the current situation.
b. Review of ConstitutionalQuestions
Critics of proposals to create an independent tax tribunal
argue that such an administrative tribunal would lack
jurisdiction to resolve disputes involving constitutional
questions.32 1 The California Constitution provides that no
administrative agency may declare a statute unenforceable or
refuse to enforce a statute on the basis of it being
unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a
determination that the statute is unconstitutional.2 2 The
proposed ABA Model State Administrative Tax Tribunal Act
addresses the issue by providing that the tax tribunal shall
decide questions regarding the constitutionality of statutes
and regulations, but shall not have the power to declare a
statute unconstitutional on its face. 23
The model act
proposes that a taxpayer with a constitutional claim may
commence a declaratory action in the trial court and file a
petition with the tax tribunal with respect to the remainder of
the matter, which is stayed pending resolution of the

320. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130 (1971).
321. See Turner Letter, supra note 272, at 2.
322. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (Deering 2006).
323. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT §7(e) (Proposed Draft Jan.

18, 2005).
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constitutional claim. 2 4 As an alternative, the model act
would permit the taxpayer to pursue a petition with the tax
tribunal with respect to all issues other than the
constitutional challenge and to preserve the constitutional
challenge for presentation to the appellate court,325 or to
bifurcate the matter by pursuing a declaratory action in the
state courts regarding the constitutional issue and, at the
same time, proceeding with the remaining issues in the tax
tribunal. 2 6
The procedure contemplated in the model act provides
taxpayers with an expedient process to pursue constitutional
claims through the judiciary in state tax matters that is more
efficient than the existing structure. Under the current
structure, the taxpayer must first pay the tax in order to raise
a constitutional claim in the Superior Court in the course of a
In addition, in order to raise
claim for refund. 2 7
constitutional issues, either the taxpayer must forego any
administrative review by paying the tax and proceeding with
a claim for refund, or the taxpayer must pursue the matter to
completion through a Board of Equalization hearing (where
the constitutional question may be raised but not decided),
then pay the tax and file a refund action.
c.

Small Tax Cases

Opponents of an independent California tax tribunal also
argue that a tribunal modeled on the United States Tax
Court would complicate access for pro se taxpayers in small
claims matters.3 28 A provision for a small claims procedure is

324. See id. § 7(e)(1). In Delta Dental Plan v. Mendoza, 139 F.3d 1289, 1396
(9th Cir. 1998), the court notes that Section 3.5, article III, of the California
Constitution does not prevent a party from raising an issue before the
administrative agency in order to preserve the issue for review in the State
courts. See also S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 716 F.2d 1285,
1291 (9th Cir. 1983).
325. See MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 7(e)(2).
326. See id. § 7(e)(3).
327. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 32; see CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 6931
(Deering 2006) (barring any action to enjoin collection of tax).
328. See Turner Letter, supra note 272, at 3. Several opponents to this
legislation repeat the silly statement that, "One need look no further than the
U.S. Tax Court's rules of procedure, some 200 plus pages long, compared with
32 pages of the BOE's Rules of Practice to understand the significant jump in
complexity that will result from a U.S. Tax Court style administrative
adjudication." Id.; see also e.g., Letter from Marc A. Aprea, Aprea and Co. Gov't
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a necessary part of the creation of an independent tax
tribunal. Simplified access to an independent tribunal for
small claims litigants is important to the perception of
fairness for all taxpayers. In addition, small cases deserve
the opportunity for an independent hearing by knowledgeable
tax professionals.
At the election of the taxpayer, the small case procedure
in the United States Tax Court is available for matters with
less than $50,000 in dispute.32 9 A small tax case is initiated
by the taxpayer with a simplified form of petition that is
provided by the Tax Court rules. 330 The rules do not require
further pleadings.33 1 Trials of small tax cases are to be
conducted "as informally as possible consistent with orderly
procedure, and any evidence deemed by the Court to have
probative value shall be admissible." 332 Decisions in small tax
cases are not appealable.3 3
The proposed ABA Model State Administrative Tax
Tribunal Act contains provisions for a small claims division of
the tax tribunal to hear cases at the election of the taxpayer
in which the net amount of tax is less than $25,000. 3 4 As
under the United States Tax Court rules, hearings proposed

Relations Firm, on behalf of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP to Ellen M. Corbett,
Chairwoman, Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 3 (Apr. 7, 2004) (on file with
author). What these commentators omit is the fact that the U.S. Tax Court
rules regarding small claims procedures are simple and very short, comprising
less than three pages.

See U.S. TAX COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE, tit. XVII,

Small Tax Cases, R. 170-175. Also, since the U.S. Tax Court rules regarding
regular cases contemplate a full hearing in which both sides fully present a
case, including briefs, witnesses and evidence, the rules are more extensive
than the procedures before the Board of Equalization, which are informal and
not adjudicative in their nature. Section 33 of Assembly Bill number 2472
originally contained a provision permitting the California Tax Court to establish
a streamlined hearing process for tax matters in excess of $10,000, but this
provision was removed by amendment. See Assemb. B. 2472 § 33, 2003-2004
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
329. See I. R. C. § 7463(a)(1); U.S. TAX COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE, R.170,
171(b).
330. See U.S. TAX COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE, R. 173(a), app. 1, Form 2.

331. See id. R. 173(b) and (c). An answer is required only with respect to
issues where the Commissioner of Internal Revenue bears the burden of proof,
or where the Court otherwise directs. A reply is required only if the Court
directs.
332. Id. R. 174(b).
333. See I. R. C. § 7463(b) (2000).
334. MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 14(a) and (c) (Proposed Draft

Jan. 18, 2005).
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for the small claims division are to be "informal, and the
judge may receive such evidence as the judge deems
appropriate for determination of the case."335 Decisions of the

small claims division would not be appealable, nor considered
as precedent in other cases. 36
The informal dispute
resolution procedure for small taxpayers allows access to an
independent decision maker in small cases. A small case
procedure can easily, and should be, incorporated into the
creation of an independent tax tribunal for California tax
matters.
d. Admission to PracticeBefore the Tax Tribunal
The Rules of Practice of the Board of Equalization allow
taxpayers to be represented "at all levels of review by any
person of the taxpayer's choosing, including, but not limited
to, an attorney, appraiser, accountant, bookkeeper, employee
or business associate." 33 7 Accountants have raised concerns

about potential restrictions on practice before an
administrative tax tribunal that would not automatically
permit certified public accounts to represent taxpayers before
the tribunal.3
Admission to practice before the United

335. Id. § 14(g).
336. See id. § 14(h).
337. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 5073(a) (2005).
338. See Letter from Bruce C. Allen, Dir. Gov't Relations, Cal. Soc'y Certified
Pub. Accountants, to Assemb. Member Lois Wolk (Feb. 17, 2004). Mr. Aprea
wrote:
Under existing law, taxpayers may choose to have their accountant
assist them before the Board of Equalization (BOE). It is the
taxpayer's accountant that best understands the individual of business
and their tax returns. [ 1 Only when a taxpayer appeals a decision by
the BOE to the Superior Court, does existing law proscribe and limit
who may provide the taxpayer assistance before the Superior Court.
Over 95% of all cases are decided by the BOE. Less than 5% are
appealed to the Superior Court.
Aprea, Letter in Opposition to A.B. 2472 on behalf of Price Waterhouse Coopers,
LLP, supra note 328. Following this logic, accountants should be permitted to
appear in the Superior Court in tax matters. Another commentator on A.B.
2472 counters this argument:
Further, PriceWaterhouse Coopers appears to be opposing the bill from
the standpoint that they are concerned that their representatives may
not be able to practice in front of the Tax Court. Nonetheless PWC
manage to fashion legal arguments concerning constitutionality of the
California Tax Court. [ 1 Although I have no problem in allowing
accountants to practice in front of the California Tax Court, it is
apparent that PWC is an accounting firm wanting to practice law
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States Tax Court requires the applicant to establish good
moral character and the "requisite qualifications to provide
competent representation before the Court." 33 9 Attorneys are
required to file a certificate with the Tax Court showing that
the attorney is admitted in good standing to the bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States or the highest court of a
state or the District of Columbia. 4 ° Non-attorneys are
required to pass an examination administered by the Tax
Court to establish that the applicant is qualified to provide
qualified representation before the Tax Court. 41 In addition,
an applicant for admission by examination must be sponsored
by at least three persons who are admitted to practice before
the Tax Court who provide the Court with letters of
recommendation submitted after the applicant has passed the
Court's written examination.3 4 2 The proposed ABA Model
State Administrative Tax Tribunal Act would provide for
appearance before the tax tribunal by the taxpayer, an
attorney admitted to practice in the state, including attorneys
who are members of an accounting firm or professional
services firm, an accountant licensed in the state, or by an
enrolled agent authorized to practice before the Internal
Revenue Service.3 43 The recent California tax court proposal
would have restricted practice before a California Tax Court
to attorneys, a participant in an accredited law school tax
clinic, and persons licensed to practice before the Internal
Revenue Service (e.g. enrolled agents) provided that the
person has satisfied requirements for admission specified in
rules of practice before the State Tax Court or the person is
admitted to practice before the United States Tax Court. 44

without passing the Bar. [ ] Further, their concerns about the cost of
the bill makes me wonder about the millions of dollars of tax shelters
that PWC created for their clients without being concerned about the
effect on state tax revenues.
Letter from Phillip L. Jelsma, Luce Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, to
Assemb. Member Lois Wolk (May 17, 2004) (on file with author).
339. U.S. TAX COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE, tit. XVII, Small Tax Cases, R.
200(a)(1).
340. Id. R. 200(a)(2).
341. Id. R. 200(a)(3).
342. Id. R. 200(c).
343. MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 16(a) (Proposed Draft Jan.
18, 2005).
344. See Assemb. B. 2472 § 33, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (adding CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE §25167(a)).
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The principal drafters of the Model Act explain the decision to
broaden the scope of permissible representatives to the tax
tribunal as follows:
The Model Act rule is based on several realities. In many
cases, a non-attorney tax professional, such as an
accountant with years of experience in tax dispute
resolution, is competent to present a tax case effectively.
Moreover, experienced tax attorneys and litigators are
today commonly employed as members or employees of
accounting or other professional service firms. Finally,
many taxpayers prefer to have their regular tax
professionals represent them in the first hearing before an
independent forum, rather than absorb the time and
345
expense of hiring and educating legal counsel.
If a California tax tribunal is established as an
administrative
tribunal,
accepting
representation
by
professionals
experienced with tax issues, including
accountants, would provide taxpayers with flexibility to
employ the professional that the taxpayer believes would best
represent him or her. Whether applied to attorneys or other
professionals, the tax tribunal should be permitted to adopt
its own rules of practice, qualifications for admission to
practice,
and authority to regulate and discipline
practitioners appearing before it.
3.

What About the Boardof Equalization?

Opponents of an independent tax tribunal cite
duplication and cost as reasons for rejecting the proposal. 4 6
The obvious answer to the question of duplication and cost, as
suggested by most of the studies and commissions that have
examined the issue, is consolidation of tax collection into a
single executive agency and elimination of the Board of
Equalization. The latter step would require repeal of the
State Constitutional provisions that create the Board of
Equalization3 47 and empower it to equalize local assessment
rolls, 348 assess certain public utility property, 34 9 assess the
345. See Allen & Fields, supra note 272, at 90.
346. See, e.g., Aprea, Letter in Opposition to A.B. 2472 on behalf of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, supra note 328, at. 6-7.
347. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 17.
348. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 18. As noted above, this function is obsolete
because of the limitation of Article XIII of the California Constitution. See
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taxes on insurance companies, 35 and assess and collect excise
taxes
on alcoholic
beverages. 311
Some additional
Constitutional references to the Board would require
revision. 5 2
Unfortunately, however, any attempt at
constitutional revision would complicate efforts to achieve
either consolidation of tax collection or creation of an
independent tax tribunal.
Other than equalization of
property taxes, assessment of certain property, collection of
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, and collection of the
insurance tax, consolidation can be achieved by statute.
Likewise, creation of an independent tax tribunal for dispute
resolution is purely a statutory matter, although including
the authority of a tax tribunal in the State Constitution with
provisions of judicial review would end questions about the
jurisdiction of the tribunal.
There is a potential role for the Board of Equalization to
continue as the forum for administrative appeals.
The
proposed ABA Model State Administrative Tax Tribunal Act
calls for an opportunity for a determination of tax liability by
an independent administrative appeals function, which is
defined as "a program of holding conferences and negotiating
settlements that is designed to resolve the vast majority of

supra text accompanying note 99 on property taxation in California to one
percent of assessed value, which is the purchase price of real property adjusted
for inflation by no more than two percent per year.
349. Section 19, article 3, of the California Constitution provides in part that:
The Board shall annually assess (1) pipelines, flumes, canals, ditches,
and aqueducts lying within 2 or more counties and (2) property, except
franchises, owned or used by regulated railway, telegraph, or telephone
companies, car companies operating on railways in the State, and
companies transmitting or selling gas or electricity. This property shall
be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as
other property.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 19.
350. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28(h).
351. See CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22.
352. These include CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14 (recall petitions), art. III, § 8(1)
(salaries of Board members set by the Citizens Compensation Commission), art.
IV, § 18(b) (impeachment), art. V, § 5(b) (vacancies filled by the Governor), art.
V, § 14(f) (limitation on compensation from lobbyists), art. VII, § 10(a)
(defamatory campaign statements), art. XIII, § 3(j) (participation by a Board
member in the identification of immature trees for property tax exemption), art.
XIII, § 11(g) (assessment of property owned by a local government outside of its
boundaries), art. XVI, § 10 (excluding federal aid-to-aged programs from the
maximum expenditure base for local government independent of authorization
by the Board of Equalization), and art. XXI, § 1 (reapportionment).
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tax controversies without litigation on a basis that is fair and
With the
impartial to the State and the taxpayer ...
creation of an independent tax tribunal, the Board of
Equalization might itself fulfill this requirement. The Board
could be structured to function much as it does today by
conducting hearings on appeals for tax assessments.
Alternatively the Board could be restructured to supervise an
appeals office, with appeals officers handling cases, similar to
the Appeals Division of the Internal Revenue Service. 54 The
latter approach would provide a review by experienced tax
professionals who are independent of the tax collection
agency, but remove the direct decision making from elected
officials. The elected Board members would protect the public
interest through oversight of the appeals decision and review
of the quality of decision-making.
There are two potential arguments against continuation
of an administrative appeals function in the Board of
Equalization.
First, it would involve continuation of a
duplicative administrative structure. Second, there would be
no appeal from taxpayer favorable rulings, as is the case
today. The elected Board of Equalization would remain in a
position to thwart legislatively enacted tax policy on the basis
of the independent policy views of the Board members.
Finally, the Board of Equalization could continue in its
role as policy advisor and research agency for California tax
policy, an important function in providing guidance to the
Governor and the Legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
California's tax collection administration is burdened
with an administrative structure that dates to the early
history of California taxation when state government relied
primarily upon a share of property taxes assessed by local
The elected Board of Equalization was
elected officials.
enshrined in the State Constitution to equalize county
property tax assessments as an attempt to fairly allocate the
burden of supporting the state government. As sources of
revenue were expanded to encompass different tax bases, the

353. MODEL STATE ADMIN. TAX TRIBUNAL ACT § 8(a) (Proposed Draft Jan. 18,

2005).
354. See supra text accompanying note 208.
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administrative structure grew with the addition of new tax
collection agencies, in part because of political struggles over
which agency would have authority to assess and collect
taxes. The result, as stated in the opening quotation of this
article, is an "administration structure [that] is characterized
by overlapping duplications, financial waste, and diffusion of
activities and responsibilities. It is a hodgepodge of boards
and elective and appointive officials and is not truly
responsible to the governor, the Legislature, or the people."35 5
As part of the many compromises regarding tax collection
authority, principal responsibility for dispute resolution has
fallen to the State Board of Equalization.
The elected
members of the Board of Equalization are often political
figures who either are former members of the state
legislature affected by term limits, or political figures with
aspiration for higher office. They are not individuals selected
on the basis of experience with tax matters or with the
process of adjudication. Indeed, one suspects that the voters
electing the Board members have little or no idea of the
purpose and function of the Board of Equalization. The
Board places little emphasis on creating a base of written
decisions upon which taxpayers may rely in interpreting
California tax statutes.
Indeed, there is no basis for
consistency in decision making by the Board in the absence of
written interpretations with precedential value. Application
of the rule of law in tax matters may vary with frequent and
periodic changes of membership through the electoral
process. Results are impacted by withdrawal of members
because of political contributions and financial conflicts of
interest. The informal nature of hearings before the Board,
while welcomed by large companies and practitioners with
regular access to Board members through ex parte contacts,3 56

355. SUBCOMM. OF THE ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note
57, at 9; ASSEMB. INTERIM COMM. ON GOV'T ORG., supra note 8, at 29.

356. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph A. Vinateieri, Bewley, Lassleben & Miller,
LLP, to Judy Chu, Chair Assemb. Appropriations Comm. (May 14, 2004); Letter
from N. Douglas Martin, Vice-President and Counsel, Gov't & Indus. Affairs,
Fireman's Fund, to Assemb. Member Lois Wolk (Apr. 7, 2004); Letter from D.
Michael Foulkes, Manager State and Local Gov't Affairs, Apple Computer, to
Assemb. Member Lois Wolk (Apr. 6, 2004) (on file with author). At the time the
letter was written, Apple had an appeal pending before the Board that involved
a substantial liability. See Appeal of Apple Computer, Inc., 2006-SBE-002, Case
No. 152016 (Nov. 20, 2006). Another commentator on A.B. 2472 wrote:
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does not lead to the appearance of competent decision making
involving the finding of fact based on evidence and the
consistent application of law to the facts so found.
Investors, business owners, and individuals deserve the
opportunity to plan their financial affairs with the benefit of
consistent and equitable guidance regarding application of
the state's tax laws. All citizens and residents of California
deserve assurance that the tax statutes enacted by the
legislature are fairly applied and that no taxpayer is provided
special treatment because of access to the members of the
Board of Equalization. Taxpayers and residents, particularly
business interests, should not be faced with California's
confusing multiplicity of tax collection agencies.
For decades, virtually every legislative study, board and
commission to examine the issue independent of the special
interests embedded in the existing administrative structure
has recommended consolidation of California's tax collection
activity into a single administrative agency responsible to the
Governor. Most reviews also have recommended the creation
of an independent tribunal for the resolution of tax disputes.
Both steps would represent a significant improvement in
California tax policy. However, there are powerful interests
vested in the current structure.3 57 Full consolidation would
I am concerned that certain special interests have opposed this bill.
For example, Apple Computer, a public company with hundreds of
millions of dollars and the ability to hire the finest counsel and
consultants available seeks to deny the general public the same access
to Superior Court it enjoys. It is both prejudicial and short sighted to
oppose this bill. Although it is no problem for Apple Computer to write
a seven-figure check, the average Californian does not enjoy the same
luxury.
Jelsma, supra note 338.
357. Professor Asimow describes the Board of Equalization's lobbying
campaign to exclude Board decisions from the California Administrative
Procedure Act Bill of Rights provisions as follows:
Thus, the Bill of Rights provisions relating to separation of functions,
pecuniary bias, and ex parte contact would have fundamentally
changed the way the SBE functions. After a few initial submissions,
the SBE remained silent during Commission deliberations. But once
S.B. 523 reached the legislature, the SBE conducted an all-out lobbying
campaign to win exclusion from the Act. Several Board members were
former legislators; they contacted the present legislators with their
concerns. The California Taxpayers Association ("CTA"), which
represents the largest corporate taxpayers, lobbied vigorously to
exclude SBE, even though the reforms in the Bill were primarily protaxpayer. But CTA persuaded the Republican caucus that the bill was
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require constitutional amendments. Persuading California
voters to eliminate elective positions would be a difficult task.
Even fixes that can be accomplished with statutory change
are difficult because of political interest in retaining elective
offices for termed-out politicians and future office seekers.
Members of the legislature are unlikely to eliminate positions
that offer further political career opportunity. There is little
constituency for complex reform on the basis of good
government.
California's tax administration is not broken. It is,
however, a patchwork quilt of administrative agencies that
confronts taxpayers with a bewildering array of different
offices for each of the many taxes in place in California.
There is no independent dispute resolution process except for
the time-consuming and expensive recourse to the Superior
Courts in a claim for refund. Even there, the courts create
little interpretive guidance regarding application of the
statutory and regulatory provisions of the tax law. The
pathway to reform has been extensively studied and the trail
is marked. The only thing missing is the political will to
embark on change.

"unfriendly to taxpayers." These largest taxpayers, evidently, wanted
to maintain their backdoor access to decision-makers and their ability
to influence
decisions
through
making
strategic
campaign

contributions.
In a dramatic confrontation before the Assembly Consumer
Protection, Governmental Efficiency, and Economic Development

Committee, the SBE won exclusion from the bill on a 7-6 party line
vote. All Republicans
voted for exclusion,
following the
recommendation of their caucus; all Democrats voted to keep SBE in
the bill. To the author of this article, this Committee decision was the
biggest single disappointment of the entire process.
Asimow, supra note 182, at 307.

